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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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PANY, a corporation; PLEASANT 
GROVE IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
corporation; and LEHI IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and, Respondents, 
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HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer of 
the State of Utah (successor in office of 
Ed H. Watson, former State Engineer 
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COPPER CORPORATION, a corpora-
tion; UTAH POWER AND LIGHT 
COMPANY, a corporation; SALT LAKE 
CITY, a municipal corporation; UTAH 
AND SALT LAKE CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; NORTH JORDAN IRRI-
GATION COMPANY, a corporation; 
SOUTH JORDAN CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; and EAST JORDAN 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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Attorneys fior the City and the other 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN FORK IRRIGATION COM-
PANY, a corporation; PLEASANT 
GROVE IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
corporation; and LEHI IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer of 
the State of Utah (successor in office of 
Ed H. Watson, former State Engineer 
of the State of Utah); KENNECOTT 
COPPER CORPORATION, a corpora-
tion; UTAH POWER AND LIGHT 
COMPANY, a corporation; SALT LAKE 
CITY, a municipal corporation; UTAH 
AND SALT LAKE CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; NORTH JORDAN IRRI-
GATION COMPANY, a corporation; 
SOUTH JORDAN CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; and EAST JORDAN 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and AppeUants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT· OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7626· 
A brief, general statement of the matters which 
divide us will aid in understanding the more detailed 
facts to follow. 
The first main ;point is as to whether the owner of an 
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2 
upper ·right to use water for direct application may store 
it for later season use, when the lower users' rights de-
pend uponthe rhn-off flow and se.epage water from such 
direct application. 
Whether, by their application to ''change the nature 
of us·e," respondents may icquire the right to store the 
early high water flows from American Fork Creek, and 
return the water stored above for use by them in the later 
·season, and for later drainage therefrom to Utah Lake. 
Whether such application must be approved, because 
of the fact that in some years waters are spilled or wasted . 
from Utah Lake, prior to the irrigation season of appel-
lants and other users from the Lake. 
Whether the operation of such proposed plan would 
result in (1) giving respondents additional water rights, 
or (2) affecting lower users' as to their quantity or time 
of use; and, whether such plan could feasibly, practicably, 
or possibly be administered so as not to do one, or both, 
of these. 
Whether the problems of administration and distri-
bution, imposed by this plan and by the Statutes are 
administrative problems for determination or control by 
the State Engineer, or legal problems for exclusive deter-
mination and control by the Trial Court. And, whether 
administrative duties, which may not feasibly or possi-
bly be exercised by· the State Engineer so as to protect 
vested rights, may be imposed u:pon him by the Court. 
The M·ater~al F~acts on the Above Matters are: 
(As, the transcript is numbered separately, we will 
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3 
refer to the pages of it by use of the letter "T ", and to 
the record by use of the letter '' R' '.) 
Diligence Rights to the use of the waters of An1erican 
Fork Creek, including the waters of the Silver Creek 
Basin drainage channel thereto, as more directly here 
involved, were acquired long prior to this application. 
The respondents either owned, or controlled and ad-
ministered, some of these rights. Their rights were and 
are for direct irrigation, on lands in and around Pleasant 
Grove, ~-llnerican Fork, and Lehi. 
The rights of the appellant companies in waters in 
and from Utah Lake were, likewise, acquired long prior 
to this application. The so-called five '' Asso.ciation 
Canals" include Salt Lake City and the four Canal Com-
panies named. They each maintain and o:perate their 
canals and irrigation systems in Salt Lake Connty, for 
distribution to and use by their members and users there. 
Substantially all irrigation in said County is from Utah 
Lake. The Kennecott Copper Corporation uses its waters 
for both irrigation and industrial purposes. The water 
reaches these canal systems through the Jordan River. 
All the waters available from Utah Lake have been fully 
appropriated, and the waters therefrom have been, for 
many years, insufficient to supply the rights thereto 
.,; (T·. 309-314). 
In 1946, respondents filed, in the State Engineer's 
Office, their change ·application, A-1945, here involved 
(Ex. "B"). The Engineer, after hearings, entered his 
decision, denying the application, and stating his findings 
and reasons therefor (R. 45-48). On appeal therefrom, 
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the District Court of Utah County entered its findings 
and judgment, reversing the State Engineer, and order-
ing him to reinstate the application and to proceed with 
the propos·ed storage plan (R.119). 
This application, as amended, sought to withhold 
and store, between April 1st and June 15th each year, 
1,000 acre feet of water, to be withheld or ''changed'' 
from direct flow to the proposed reservoir at the rate of 
35 cfs. This would take, if continuous, .about 14 or 15 
days. 'The application recites that the "drainage area to 
which the source of supply belongs" is "Utah Lake and 
Jordan River." The water stored is to be released be-
tween April 1st" and October 30th. 
The proposed reservoir site is about 14 miles (T. 
21) above and northeasterly from respondents' diversion 
weir, at the point where American Fork Creek emerges 
from the canyon. This reservoir site is at an elevation 
of 9,000 to 9,500 feet (T. 215-216). The snow reaches 
substantial depth up there, and stays until about June. 
Access to this site, in part or all of the period of April 
1st to June 15th, ean be had only by use of snow shoes. 
The run-off from the snow there starts about l\fay or 
June, and continues to about July (T. 218). 
In addition to the legal limitation of respondents' 
diligence rights to that quantity of water beneficially 
used at the time of its acquirement, and to the statutory 
limitation to the quantity of water required for beneficial 
use at any and all times, the capacity of respondents' 
diversion ditches from American Fork Creek places a 
maximum limitation upon their right. 
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The capacity of the Lehi diversion ditch was and 
is about 100 efs.: the extent of the American Fork rights 
of respondents' shareholders is about 80 cfs. (T. 35, 71); 
the capacity of the Pleasant Grove ditch is 100 cfs. ~T. 
43, 82) ; a total maximum capacity and total maximum 
water which can be diverted and used, at any· tune, of 
approxiinately 300 cfs. ( T. 35, 42). Waters that cannot 
be taken out to Lehi and Pleasant Grove go down the 
American Fork area, to supply about 5,000 acres. 
This n1aximum is a substan~ial portion of the high 
water flow in the Creek, at the point of diversion, but is 
not nearly all of it. \Vhether the capacity of these di-
version ditches may be required for beneficial use, or 
what portion thereof may be so required at any time, 
depends upon the changing conditions from season to sea-
son, and from day to day. 
The waters, except for such diversion, would flow 
directly to the Lake, a distance of about 7 Tniles. Water, 
whi0h is diverted and used, naturally drains toward the 
Lake. The portion thereof that may reach the Lake, and 
the tin1e at which it may do so, depends upon the condi-
tion of the soil on which it is used, the extent of use and 
re-use, and the condition of the weather, and the affect of 
this upon loss by evaporation, and the condition, char-
acter, and state of growth of the crops, as to what mois-
ture ma~, be taken up by these in transpiration losses 
(T. 134-135, 1-1-1-, 209-213, 320-321,334-339, 359). 
The nature of this irrigated area, as to slope, is 
somewhat comparable to a section of a saucer. The arc 
of the outside rim of this portion centers roughly at the 
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point of diversion from American Fork Creek. The 
westerly portion of the arc, in the direction of the Lehi 
ditch, circles out and gradually down to the Lake shore, 
at a point south of Lehi. The easterly portion of the arc, 
in the direction of the Pleasant Grove diversion, circles 
out and down to the Lake southwesterly from Pleasant 
Grove. The area is enclosed by higher ground, near each 
of the ends .of the arc. The American Fork ditches serve 
the central area. 
The slope of the saucer is generally toward the Lake. 
The natural ehannel of American Fork Creek below 
A1n:erican Fork is not used to carry all the undiverted 
waters of this Creek at the diversion point. Artificial 
channels take out portions, or all, of these waters to the 
westerly side for milling, and other purposes (T. 34). 
Also, due to the lower elevation of the mill pond, known 
as "i\1ulliner's Pond," and to the topography, as shown 
by the topographical ma·p (Ex. "11"), a large portion of 
these diverted waters flow to this pond, and thence, 
through "Spring Creek" (Lehi), to the Lake (T. 43-44, 
48). 8ee, also, the maps (Exs. "10", "15") for these 
locations, and the elevation contours. 
There are approximately 5024 acres in the American 
Fork system irrigable area (T. 57); 7000 acres in the Lehi 
area (T. 109); and 5000 acres in the Pleasant Grove 
area ( T. 80). The latter two areas have other natural 
sources of irrigation water. All of the areas have access 
to D·eer Creek Reservoir water. (See Ex. '' 15'' for 
course of channel.) Both Lehi and Pleasant Grove areas 
use Deer Creek ReS>ervoir water (T. 109-110). 
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The irrigated lands, in the whole area, fall into three 
classes: 
1. The upper bench lands, ~onsisting of about 3800 
acres, are of porous soil, and have no sustained 
water table level. The seepage and run-off from 
these is rapid (T. 143-144, 209-210). 
2. The intermediate land, consisting of about 
5, 700 acres, where the level of the water table 
varies frmn a few feet below to near, or at, the 
surface. 
3. The bottom lands, of about 6500 acres, where 
the water table is at the surface a good deal of 
the time, hut which is irrigated in later season 
(T. 212-213) . 
In the later irrigation season the seepage and waste 
waters are continuously picked up in waste ditches, and 
the water re-used throughout the area and throughout 
the irrigation season (T. 213, 68). There are several 
users having rights secondary to appellants' for lower 
uses in this area (T. 57, 68-71, 81). The three res:pondents 
have different rights, as between themselves, as to the 
proportion of the Creek flow each shall get in the high 
water and in the later low water s·easons ( R. 8). 
More Directly on t.he Qwa.ntity of Water Ava.i~able from 
Americarn Fork Creek, the Records show: 
That high water flows are in May and June. 
The U. S. Geological Survey took readings on this 
flow (Ex. "4") each day for each' nwnth from 1927 to 
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1948, inclusive, at a point just above a power plant, about 
4.10 miles above the mouth of the canyon (T. 190). 
The following table shows the maximum recorded 
flows in May and .June oif each of these 22 years, with the 
year, month, da~,, and quantity of flow at this point, as 
follows: 
MAY JUNE 
Year Day Cfs. Year Day Cfs. 
1927 17 429 1927 8 370 
1928 27 339 1928 1 341 
1929 25 298 1929 16 326 
1930 29 168 1930 8 149 
1931 16 124 1931 1 76 
1932 21 314 1932 23 258 
1933 31 257 1933 3 300 
1934 8 65 1934 1 28 
1935 27 241 1935 13 306 
1936 15 335' 1936 1 250 
1937 18 346 1937 22 243 
1938 29 318 1938 3 303 
1939 4 and 31 190 1939 1 181 
1940 17 210 1940 1 120 
1941 26 285 1941 7 250 
1942 . 26 265 1942 10 232 
1943 3 184 1943 1 208 
1944 15 301 1944 2 326 
1945 13 275 1945 23 289 
1946 6 269 1946 6 200 
1947 8 341 1947 8 231 
1948 28 399 1948 2 356 
It will be seen that the peak flows are usually reached 
between May 15th and June 3rd. Only in 1935 and 1945 
were they reached after June 3rd. In most years, the 
maximum is reached in the last half of May. 
A check of Ex. "4" will also show that the April 
Creek flows at this point are very much below those of 
May and June, although in two very exceptional years 
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they were higher. April 2-1, 1930, the flow hit 193 cfs., 
as again~t a ).fay high of 168 efs.; and on April 30, 1946, 
it hit a high flow of 269 efs., as against a May high of 
229 efs. that year. 
'The Inean 22-year flows are: for April - 70.8 cfs., 
for 1[ay- 170.64 cfs., and for June- 165.8-1 cfs. Inci-
dentally, it i~ 72.94 cfs. for July, which is a little bit above 
the mean for .. A .. pril. 
There is a substantial make in the flow of the Creek 
between this point of measurement, near the upper power 
plant, and the flow at the respondents' point of diversion, 
near the nwuth of the canyon. The distance is 4.10 miles 
( T. 190). In order to get at the flow at this diversion 
point, this increase is determined by comparing the read-
ings in Ex. · · -1'' with those taken in some of these same 
years at the point of diversion. Allowing for a naturally 
heavier early run-off in the lower four n1iles, in the 
early spring, the increas·e of flow in this distance, while 
substantial, is fairly constant. 
A natural pattern of a greater percentage of make 
m the lower four miles in the late winter or spring 
months, when the lower snows were melting, and less 
make in the late summer and fall when the higher snow 
r,. waters supply the creek and the lower areas are dry, 
is reflected in these exhibits. 
Since it is alleged (R. 9) that the purpose is to with-
hold the 35 cfs. from the "high water" flows; and it is 
also admitted or established that as these high water 
flows at the diversion point substantially exceed 300 
cfs. and approach or exceed 400 cfs., the entir·e 35 cfs., 
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if not withheld, would rea;c;h the lake immediately, it be-
comes important to find how frequently these larger 
flows occur. 
Respondents alleged (R. 7) 'that, in the summer and 
latter part of the irrigation season, the flow is reduced 
to a volume not to exceed 30 cfs. 
Respondents' expert, taking 2 years (1914, 1938) for 
illustration, calculated that of all the water passing its 
weir in a year, 36% passed in May and 29% in June-
leaving only 35% for the remaining 10 months (T. 395). 
The record shows (Ex. "4") that, in the 22 years 
that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) took 
reading, about 4 miles above the diversion point, read-
ings were also taken at the diversion point in 5 of these 
years by Mr. Searle, respondent's water master (Ex. 
'' L' ') ; and in 3 of these 22 years by the State Engineer 
(Ex. '' 7' ') ; and in 1 of these years by David Gardner, 
Engineer (Ex. " C C "). 
For comparison, therefore, we have collected the 
concurrent high water readings so taken at the diversion 
point, and have set opposite these the USGS measure-
ments for May and June, the months in which they oc-
curred, in the following table: 
MAY READINGS JUNE READINGS 
Cfs. Cfs. Day Year Day Cfs. Cfs. 
Gardner USGS Gardner USGS 
399.5 243 17 1938 2 399.5 295' 
State Eng. State Eng. 
594 253 16 1938 3 430 303 
209 190 31 1939 1 184 181 
215 210 17 1940 1 133 120 
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Searle Searle 
375 301 15 1944 2 400 326 
423 255 11 1945 23 307 289 
285 260 5 1946 6 204 ('storm) 200 
399 (Av.) 300.5 4,5 1947 9 254 220 
473 319 22 1948 3 399 349 
This shows that ~lay is uniformly the high water 
month; that the average increase at the point of diver-
sion over the upper readings is just a fraction under 
45%. That is to say, that 45% of the USGS reading, 
added to it, will give the quantity flow in this month at re-
s-pondents' point of diversion. And by this ·computation, 
when there is 276 cfs. at the higher point, the rate of flow 
at the point of diversion will amount to 400 cfs. 
Ex. "4" shows that the reading of 276 cfs. by USGS 
and, therefore, the discharge of the Creek at the point 
of diversion exceeded 400 cfs. in 11 years out of the 22 
years, which we have for comparison. These 11 years, 
and the days when the May readings ·exceeded 276 cfs., 
are: 
1927- 6 days 
1928- 5 days 
1929- 1 day 
1932- 9 days 
1936- 10 days 
1937-15 days 
1938- 5 days 
1941- 1 day 
1944- 3 days 
1947- 6 days 
1948-16 days 
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We point out, also, that in 5 additional years the 
USGS ·reading reached, or exceeded, 27 4 cfs., which would 
make the lower flow within a few cfs. of 400 cfs., and 
that, in 1941 and 1946, the USGS reading reached 270 cfs. 
and 269 cfs., so that, in is out of the 22 years, the high 
water discharge at the mouth of the canyon would either 
approximate or exceed 400 cfs. 
There should he added, also, the same comparison 
on the same computation based upon 350 cfs., which is in 
excess of the capacity of the respondents' canals; and, 
also, a si1nilar comparison in computation on 300 cfs., 
which is the approximate capacity of these canals, and 
of respondents' maximuin a'p•propriations. 
These are added because substantially the same situ-
ation on the direct flows to the Lake, if not withheld, ap-
plies when the discharge reaches these figures. On this, 
the f'aine comparison shows that 241 cfs. at the USGS 
point of Ineasurmnent will produce 350 cfs. at the point 
of distribution, and, also, that, in 15 out of the 22 years, 
the USGS Ineasurement exceeded 241 cfs;, and did so 
for a considerable nu1nber of days, in each of these years, 
during .Jlay. Also, that a reading of 207 cfs. at the upper 
point would 1nake 300 cfs. at the lower point of diversion, 
and that 207 cfs. passed the upper point in 17 of the 22 
years, and that this occurred on a con~iderable number of 
days, in Inost of these years, during May. 
While we have set up above the month of June as well 
as May, for comparison, in showing the readings taken 
at the point of diversion, June is not so very important on 
this point, as very few high water peaks are then reached; 
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and, under the application A-1945, there could be no 
withholding anyway after June 15th. 
~\s stated above, the percentage of increase in June 
is less, due, perhaps, to the the snow being out in the 
lower canyon areas. However, in making a similar com-
parison, the Searle reading of June 23, 1945, should he 
eliminated, as that comes after the 15th; and the read-
ing for June 6, 1946, should also be eliminated, because 
he shows (Ex. · · L' ') that this was abnormal, due to 
"storm.~· 
Thus, we arrive on the readings in this month at a 
23% increase, between these two points. On this basis, 
-100 cfs. would have been ex.ceeded in 1927 - 8 days; 1941 
-1 day: and 1948- 3 days. In 1948, it was, in fact, 473 
cfs. (See Ex. "L"). 
Also, there are a considerable number of years in 
which the capacity of respondents' canal, at the diversion 
point, was exceeded in June, as the comparison and 
calculations show. 
Lake Inflows: 
Some surface run-off inflows to the Lake, in this 
area, were measured by Mr. Gardner, an Engineer (T. 
193), for the last half of 1937, as well as for 1938, 1939, 
and 1940 (Ex. "6"). This report of measurement shows 
the monthly acre feet flows, and does not show daily 
flow. It shows the streams measured, and his map (Ex. 
"11 ") shows the location of each of these inflows. There 
is no information available as to the total quantity of 
run-off waters in this area, and, of course, no measure-
ment of seepage waters that reach the Lake. It appears 
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that this seepage, and other inflows, cannot be actually 
measured. (See the Lake Commissioner's report for 
1936, at page 7). 
As stated a;bove, at the extreme Lehi end of this area, 
and also at the Pleasant Grov·e end, other waters came 
into these channel inflows. At the Lehi end, however, 
these waters in Bull Pasture Drain and Lehi City Drain 
(Ex. •' 6' ') are significant. At the Pleasant Grove end, 
however, the outside waters through the Geneva Cannery 
Drain were substantial (T. 208). 
To get the measured surface inflows that came from 
American Fork Creek drainage, perhaps one-half of the 
Geneva Cannery Drain should be deducted. However, 
for the purpose of comparison of these flows with the 
flow in American Fork Greek, to determine the direct 
aff.ect of the latter flows upon the Lake inflows, this de-
duction is of no importance, and would make no substan-
tial difference as to this. 
It so happens that, of the three years in which these 
flows were measured, 1938 is the only large flow year, 
and the only year in which there were substantial high 
water flows in the high water months (Ex. "4"). This 
exhibit, covering the USGS measurements on the Creek, 
show 318 cfs. for May 29th, and a mean flow for that 
month of 194 cfs. In 1939, the highest flow was 190 cfs., 
for May 30th, and the mean was 148 cfs. In 1940, the 
highest was 210 cfs., and the mean was 147 cfs. And, as 
pointed out above, on May 7, 1938, there was a reading 
at respondents' po·int of diversion (Ex. "CC ") of 399.5 
cfs. 
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The Lake inflows in the early n1onths of March and 
April are clearly affected by the adjacent sno'v run-off. 
The following comparative readings are taken from Ex. 
'"6" and Ex. "'-±", and show the Lake inflows and the 
FSGS measuren1ents in ~ere feet, and, also, the mean 
rates of flow in cfs.: 
MARCH APRIL 
Acre ft. Cfs. Acre ft. Cfs. 
1938 Lake 4590 74.03 5316 88.60 
USGS 922 15 5520 92.7 
1939 Lake 4826 77.84 4266 71.10 
USGS 1060 17.2 4540 76.3 
1940 Lake 3530 57 4160 69.3 
USGS 1010 16.4 3240 54.5 
Like comparison for the months of May, June, and 
July show the effect of the Creek flows on the inflows into 
the Lake, particularly in the high water year of 1938, as 
follows: 
MAY JUNE JULY 
Acre ft. Cfs. Acre ft. Cfs. Acre ft. Cfs. 
1938 Lake 7668 123.68 5341 89.02 4017 64.79 
USGS 11904 194. 12470 210. 4730 77. 
1939 Lake 3756 60.58 3322 55'.37 1466 23.64 
USGS 9080 148. 6100 103. 2550 41.5 
1940 Lake 2459 39.6 1247 27.8 789 12.7 
USGS 9040 147. 4160 69.9 1660 27.1 
It appears to he agreed, as it must, that in periods 
when the water table is high the run-off is greater and 
more direct, and the foregoing comparison clearly shows 
that, in the high water season of 1938, a more substantial 
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portion of the Cre·ek flows went immediately to the Lake. 
Incidentally, it appears (Ex. "6") that in l\Iay, 1938, 
A1nerican Fnrk Creek and "Spring Creek" (Lehi) 
rneasured 2640 aere feet. These are the more direct chan-
nels to the Lake. Also, that in 1939 and 1940, at the 
lower Creek flow:-;, these measured only 70 acre feet and 
43 acre feet, respectively. 
rrhis comparison, and these exhibits, also show that, 
as the heavier irrigation diversions occur, the Lake sur-
face inflows diminish, in comparison with the Creek 
inflows. This begins in June, and continues sharply into 
Jul~·, and reaches its lowest in August, after which the 
inflow, or seepage, from irrigation to the Lake com-
mences to increase. 
}_j1xplana.tion of Calculations: 
In converting acre feet to cubic s·econd feet, where 
both are not shown in the exhibits, we have followed 
the regular formula; i.e., that 1 cfs. flow, for 1 day, will 
equal 1.98 acre feet. But, in doing this, and for easy 
figuring, as is usually done, we have used 2.00, instead 
of 1.98, acre feet. This results in a very slightly lower 
cfs. figure. 
There is evidence in the record of the estimates by 
the Utah Lake Water Commissioner of the total cal-
culated inflows to the Lake from all the sources surround-
ing it. But, as this seems to us to have no materiality, 
we will not burden the statement with these figures. 
They are found in the Commissioner's Annual Reports, 
in evidence. 
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The ]fa.tter of TFithdratcal.-:, or Losses, f'rout the Lake: 
A principal loss of water frOin Utah Lake results 
frOin 8nrface evaporation. This, as estimated and re-
ported by the Lake Connnissioner ( T. 233-236, and see 
:278), averages about 231,000 acre feet between .May 1st 
and September 1st, as compared to about 207,000 acre 
feet drawn therefrom through the Jordan River, and 
di:::;tributed by the Commissioner, to supply the various 
uses entitled thereto. This is the matter referred to by 
the State Engineer, wher·e he says that Utah Lake rights 
are made up ''by the difference behveen that which can 
be diverted and used, and the supply.'' 
The total water thus available has not been suffi-
cient to :::;upply such rights, at least since 1936. ('T. 309-
314). The Commissioner's reports show that, for this 
reason, water has been leased by the Utah Lake users 
from \V eber River sources, and conveyed to them to and 
through the Provo River, when available. It is shown 
that all available water has been us·ed, and a good deal 
of trenching done, to draw water to the pumps, and an 
additional pumping station placed down at Pelican 
Point, in order to drain that low area. There is prac-
tically no water received through the Jordan River for 
irrigation purposes, except that which is pun11ped from 
the Lake to the River. Practically none flows by gravity. 
The evidence shows a comparison between what the 
evaporation would be on the proposed reservoir, as 
compared with what it would he on the added surface 
of the Lake, if the 1,000 acre feet were allowed to pass 
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down to the Lake in the usual way. The evidence on 
this is that the increase in area of the Lake would be 
about the same as the area of the proposed reservoir, 
and little importance is attached as to any difference 
on this (T. 124). 
Over the ohjection of the appellants, respondents 
introduced evidence of so-called "waste" of water from 
Utah Lake in the early Spring. On this, the evidence 
shows that, under the '' Colladge Decree'' (See Salt Lake 
City v. CoUadge, 13 Utah 522 (1896) ), the Utah Lake 
and Jordan River Commission was set up, and it regu-
lates the level of the Lake water, so as to avoid flooding 
of the adjacent lands (T. 300, 348-353). When it appears 
that such flooding may occur, the Commission has the 
authority to open the gate from the Lake to the River, 
to permit waters to spill, and that has been done to 
some extent during 1948, 1949, and 1950, the only years 
since 1924. In 1950, the water being spilled in March 
was being used by Kennecott Copper ( T. 301). The Lake 
users have no control over such regulation or release of 
water. 
Likewise over objection, evidence was introduced as 
to the extent of the alleged use of waters by users from 
Utah Lake, in excess of what was claimed was or should 
be reasonably required. The ciaim is that, as to the 
Commissioner's report on diversions to East Jordan 
Irrigation Company, there was indicated an excessive 
use of water, in proportion to the acreage indicated. 
While we do not consider this of any materiality, 
as to the application here involved, as is indicated by 
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the Co1nn1issioner's report for 1937 (Ex. "P "), at page 
9 thereof, both Salt Lake City water anJ Draper Irri-
gation Co1npany water is diverted through the J1Jast 
Jordan Canal. And, it is also indicated in these reports 
that there are exchanges, as between the canal cmnpanies, 
when water is badly needed by one and not needed b~' 
the other, although it is charged to the one having the 
right to use it. 
THE POINTS PRESENTED AND RELIED 
UPO~ ~-\_RE: 
1. Res,pondents may not, by a change of nature of 
use application, acquire rights to store early high water 
for use on their san1e lands in the later,_ hotter, and drier 
months, when lower Utah Lake rights depend upon the 
drainage fron1 respondents' use, by direct application; 
and, even though water 1nay, at times, spill or waste 
from Utah Lake, prior to the irrigation season. (The 
findings in this regard do not support the decree.) 
2. The record discloses that the proposed plan for 
diversion and storage would interfere with the rights of 
lower users both as to volume and as to time of use. 
(The evidence does not support the findings.) 
3. The proposed rplan of diversion, storage, and 
distribution ( 1) cannot be so administered as to insure 
that the rights of lower users will not be injuriously 
affected, and ( 2) the State J1Jngineer 's determination 
that it cannot be administered so as to avoid such injury 
is controlling, and (3) his statutory duty of administra-
tion cannot arbitrarily be controlled by the Trial Court. 
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(The decree is not supported by evidence or findings, and 
is against law.) 
ARGUMENT 
The State Engineer's well-·considered opinion dis-
,cusses matters material to the argument on all three 
points (Ex. "12"). We quote: 
' ' The evidence presented at the hearing, to-
gether with the general information available in 
the office of the State Engineer, demonstrates 
that the proposed change could interfere sub--
stantially with the vested rights of others. While, 
as noted above, the right of an applicant to change 
his nature of use is absolute, if it will not inter-
fere, the law is equally clear that the applicant 
may not enlarge his basic .right by the filing of a 
change application. If the application in effect 
constitutes an attempted enlargement of the right, 
it amounts to a new appropriation without going 
through the procedure outlined by statute. The 
applicant n1ust not, therefore, get more water 
than would have been available to it under the 
mother right. See Tanner v. Humphreys, supra, 
and Rocky Ford Irrigation Comparny v. Kents 
Lake Reservoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 
2d 108. 
''Whether or not there will be interference 
with rights already established, whether they be 
junior or senior, depends largely upon the man-
ner in which the storage is administered by a 
public official acting as commissioner. In all stor-
ages like unto the one involved here, i.e. rights in 
Utah Lake are made up in many instances by the 
difference between that which cam be diverted 
and used and the supply. 
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'• .A. direct flow user can only use that portion 
to which hi~ rig-ht entitled hin1, subject to the 
vagaries of weather, eonditions of crop, etc. Other 
flow rights may he also supplied in part in this 
same manner. * * * If this alpplication were 
granted, the diversion and storage on the stream 
would of necessity be operated in such manner 
that the water could only be stored in the pro-
posed reservoir when it ·could otherwise be bene-
ficially used by direct diversion and further limit-
ed to legally established direct flow practices. 
''The approval of the application granting 
the right to store the water represented by flow 
rights would impose upon an administrator the 
obligation o.f determining, as mentioned herein-
before, when weather conditions on the ground 
would or would not permit the use of wate-r by 
direct diversion in applying it to beneficial use 
and time when the applicant would not or could 
not, by reason of other conditions, use the water 
in whole or in part by direct diversion. This 
determination from day to day and from time 
to time would impose a rp~ractical impossibility 
upon an administrator. To not limit storage to 
times when the water could or would otherwise 
be used by direct diversion, as set out, would be 
an enlargement of the original right which can-
not be permitted under a change application. 
"It appears, in this instance, that there is no 
unappropriated water in this source on Jordan 
River downstream from Utah Lake. * * * 
"However, it is the State Engineer's duty 
to reject the application, as it is impractical of 
operation to the end that others would be adverse-
ly affected thereby, as outlined above. The appli-
cation is, therefore, rejected as of this date and 
returned to the applicant so endorsed.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
POINT I. 
Res,pondents may no't, by a change of nat111re of use 
applica;tion, acquire rights to st;ore early high water for 
use on their same larnds in the later, hoUer, arwl drier 
months, when lower Utah Lake rights depend upon the 
drainage from respondents' right of use, by dilrect appli-
c:ation; and, ecen though water may, at times, spill Of" 
waste from Ut,ah Lake, prior to the irrig'ation season. 
{The findings in this regard do not support the 
decree.) 
The practice of storing water in natural or artificial 
reservoirs in this State has heretofore related to the 
storage of unappropriated water. The applications 
usually involv~ both the appropriation of the water to 
be stored and the approval of the proposed reservoir 
facilities for such storage. These are both provided for 
under our statutes. The State Engineer has the extra 
burden, as to any artificial reservoir project, to deter-
mine whether or not the proposed operation can be 
lawfully and feasibly carried on. Otherwise, large sums 
of water users' money may be uselessly expended. 
This application, A-1945, is merely a change appli.-
cation. In 100-3-2, as to appropriation, in discussing 
merely the requirement that the application shall state 
the ''point of diversion,'' says: 
"The storage of water by means of a reser-
voir shall be regarded as a diversion, * * • '' 
The other statute dealing with reservoirs is 100-3-12, 
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the section which deals with construction of irrigation 
works. 
No additional right to the use of any water can 'be 
acquired directly or indirectly by a change application. 
As stated by the Engineer, such applicant ''must not 
• • * get more water than would have been available 
to it under the mother right.'' Nor should the applica-
tion be approved if it would "permit the applicant to 
store water it would not have used by direct flow diver-
sion," or "if the application in effe'C't constitutes an 
attempted enlargement of the right * * *.'' 
This is a defect that inheres in the ''effect'' of this 
ap-plication under the proposed plan. And this is in no 
way dependent upon the question of injury to the pro-
testants here, 'because an application to appropriate 
water for storage would clearly affect other classes, 
including all the secondary rights on Utah Lake, 'and 
would involve entirely different objections and a differ-
ent case. 
Another fundamental and elementary principle is 
that respondents' direct flow irrigation right itself is 
limited to the amount beneficially used at the time of 
and in the acquirement of such right; and is also limited 
to the amount of water required for necessary beneficial 
use, within such right, at any and all times. As the 
Engineer says, in his opinion: 
''A direct flow user can only use that portion 
to which his right entitles him subject to the 
vagaries of weather, condition of crop, etc.'' 
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In Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. (2) 882, the 
opinion by Judge Wolfe points out at Page 894 that 
the Legislature by Sec. 100-3-3 (the change application 
statute) did not intend to change Sec. 100-1-3 that: 
''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
1neasure, and the limit of all rights to the use of 
water in this State.'' 
This opinion, at this page, contains a very good 
analysis and discussion on this point, and, also, on the 
duty of the State Engineer in connection with change 
applications. 
M10ore, et ,az. v. California-Oregon Power Co., 140 
P. (2) 798, cites, at Page 805, a number of authorities 
on the point that the extent of use or enjoyn1ent measures 
the right, and says: 
"In order to gain a right to the waters the 
diverter must actually use it, and the q'/1,(J,(Ybtity 
used measures the extent of his right." 
Basic Error: 
Now, it is 1n connection with the real nature and 
lirni ts to this change application that the basic error 
in the contentions of the respondents, and in the finding 
of the Court, occurs. 
This resulted from evidel\ce offered and received 
to the effect that in three years, before the irrigation 
season, and in February and March, ~and one year in 
April, water spilled from Utah Lake into Jordan River, 
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to preYent flooding of land8 adjacent to the Lake. This 
wns done under a previous decision of this Court in the 
Colladge case, supra. These were the only year8, a.t 
least from l~l:2-! to 19-!9, in which this occurred. 
This line of evidence was repeatedly objected to 
by us, on the ground that any excess waters of Utah 
Lake, and the rights of the appropriators therein, or 
thereto, were in no way involved in this application. 
This seemed obvious to us, as it was to the State Engi-
neer, who stated, in his opinion (Ex." 12"): 
·'It appears, in this instance, that there i8 
no unappropriated water in this source on J or-
dan River down-stream from Utah Lake. There-
fore, this case * * * does not involve unappropri-
ated water down-stream on .Jordan River frmn 
Utah Lake." 
The protesting Associated Canals take their water 
on the upper end of the Jordan River, the farthest north 
point of diversion being the head-gate of the North 
Jordan Irrigation Company. 
The theory of respondents was that, if some water 
spilled into the Jordan River and passed beyon:d our 
diversions, we could not complain if a portion of Ameri-
can Fork Creek water were held back from the Lake, 
in this proposed reservoir. 
In the first place, this application is not an appli-
cation to appropriate, or even to store, water which 
would otherwise escape front Utah Lake and the Jordan 
River into Great Salt Lake; and, in the second place, 
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any unappropriated water so escaping could not be 
reached or made available or he affected in any way by 
this change application. 
It may be added here that there is also no evidence 
as to what lportion of such ''spilled'' water had already 
been appropriated, or might he put to ·a benefici~ use 
lorwer down the River. It does appear that the appellant 
Copper Company used some of this water, which was 
released prior to the irrigation season (T. 301). 
And, it clearly appears that any water spilled was 
prior to the proposed withholding here, whieh could not 
he before A1IJ'ril 15th, and would ordinarily he in the 
latter half of May. The proposed withholding would, 
therefore, not affect any water allegedly wasted from 
Utah Lake. And, since the irrigation season out of 
Utah Lake uniformly commences about the early part of 
May this proposed withholding would concur with, and 
would adversely affect the then use of water from Utah 
Lake for irrigation. 
As further illustrating the impossibility of sustain-
ing the decree on this ground, we call attention to the 
fact that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, under priority 
date of April 3, 1936, filed application 12114 in the Office 
of the State Engineer to exchange 30,000 acre feet of 
water which, it claimed, would accrue to Utah Lake by 
reason of irrigation in this area from Deer Creek 
Reservoir water, from the Weber River and other for-
eign sources, for 30,000 acre feet to be held back in the 
Deer Creek Reservoir on Provo River. This application 
was approved by the State Engineer July 23, 1941, on 
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the theory of the application that additional water would 
accrue, as it has. to Utah Lake over and above all of the 
natural supply thereto, as :previously appropriated. 
Under the decisions of the Court in Lehi I rrigatiow 
Oo. r. Jo-nes, et al., 202 P. (2) 892, and McGarry v. 
Thompson, 201 P. (2) 288, this Court may take judicial 
notice of this application and action. Thus, any water 
that may spill from Utah Lake is subject to this appli-
cation, and to the withholding thereunder, in anticipation 
of any probable spilling. It is also subject to any other 
appropriation applications that have been, or may be, 
filed thereon. 
The Utah Lake and Jordan River Commission has 
sufficient trouble already down there, in trying to deter-
mine, in advance, whether the Lake will not re,~ch com-
promise, and therefore the water may all be held back; 
or whether, if the gates are not opened in time, the Lake 
will flood the surrounding lands. Appellants have noth-
ing to do with it, and neither do respondents. 
In any event, these respondents could make no 
elaim in reference to the alleged surplus waters of the 
Lake, except 'by an application to ~appropriate ; and 
such an application would be subject to the claims of 
all prior applicants or appropriators. 
Sec. 100-1-1 provides that the waters of this State 
are the !property of the public, and 100-3-1 recites that 
no right to the use of water can be acquired, e~cept by 
application to appropriate, in the manner as provided 
in 100-3-2, whic:h also recites that, in order to acquire 
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a right to the use of any unappropriated water, appli-
cation must be made, as in that section provided. 
Likewise, appellants objected to a similar character 
of testimony offered hy respondents, in an attempt to 
prove that some of the users of water from Utah Lake 
wasted water by using more than was beneficially re-
quired. 
We objected to this line of testimony on the same 
grounds ·as we did to the alleged waste from the Lake, 
and also upon the ground that the State Engineer, 
through Commissioners appointed by him, distributes 
and controls and regulates the use of water by such 
users, and he could, and presumptively would, properly 
limit any su,ch uses. 
Clearly, and for the same reasons above stated, any 
such waters could not be reached by this application, 
and such matters are, oh:viously, unrelated to the issues 
presented here. 
Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. (2) 362. This 
case held that, on appeal from the decision of the State 
Engineer, the District Court which hears the matter 
de nova ·can do no more than the State Engineer; and, 
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues are limited 
to those which guide the State Engineer in approval or 
rejection of an application. This claim, relating to waters 
out of Utah Lake, is not mentioned in the aJpplication. 
Furthermore, and it is of great importance here on 
this and other points at issue, to note that no right 
is acquired until the issuance of a final certificate of 
permit of change of the nature of use by the State Engi-
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neer. And, in this connection, 100-3-17 U.C.A. 1943 says, 
as to this: 
''The certificate shall not extend the rights 
described in the application.'' 
It is plain, we think, that the above matters, as to 
the waters from Utah Lake, are in no way involved in 
this application, and that it was error to reverse the 
Engineer on the basis of such contention and evidence 
and findings as to any such alleged waste of water. 
It is impossible to determine from the findings and 
decision of the Trial Court whether. the intention was 
to reverse the State Engineer upon the immediately 
foregoing issue alone, or whether the decision also chal-
lenges the decision of the State Engineer that the effect 
of the changed operation would be to give respondents an 
added use; and that the proposed operation would injure 
the existing rights, and could not be administered so as 
not to do so. 
Under the authorities cited, a diligence right for 
direct flow irrigation would not include, or justify, or 
constitute a right of storage. It may be contended, how-
ever, that, if the storage does not enlarge the acquired 
right, or infringe on existing rights, this kind of change 
may be authorized. Under the next Points, II and III, 
we shall show that, on the Record, this change cannot be 
made, as the Engineer has decided, without the effe~t 
of enlarging respondents' right and infringing upon the 
existing rights of alppellants, and others. 
At this point, we will cite the cases which we have 
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found, dealing with withholding by an upper direct user, 
for later use by him; and .holding generally that such 
may not he legally done, where vested rights to the 
run-off from direct flow use are involved. 
So far as we have been able to find, this question 
has not been considered by the Courts of this State. 
And we have found no case anywhere passing directly 
upon the powers and duties of the State Engineer, as to 
a proposal of this character .. 
In 1910, J. E. Ethell, a Colorado attorney who has 
written extensively on irrigation law, contributed an 
Article-71 Central Law Journal 58-in which he stated 
that the question of whether an ''owner of a prior righ~ 
to water for direct application (is) privileged to store 
for future use,'' said that only two cases had been 
decided on the question: 
Williams v. AltmJovw (Or.), 95 P. 200; 
Seven Lakes Reservroiu- Co. v. New Loveland 
Etc. Co. (Colo.), 93 P. 485. 
He indicates that the former case held that such 
an owner could be so privileged, and that the latter 
(Colo.) case held that he could. While neither of the 
cases is exactly in point, they may be of help here. 
In the Colorado case, the defendant reservoir com-
pany was incorporated for, and was engaged in, acquir-
ing and maintaining reservoirs for storage. It did not 
attempt, as here, to withhold a portion 'Of its previously 
acquired direct flow right. There was no question of 
appropriation of new water either, but it acquired two 
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existing water rig·hts for purposes of storage, and pro-
ceeded to store this water for uses later in the season 
than that to which it had been previously applied hy 
the owners. 
This was apparently a part of a large supply, from 
a large source. and there was no question in the case 
as to the previous, or any drainage or run-off from the 
direct flow use thereof. The opinion held that, as to 
the rights acquired, the former use had 'been entirely 
abandoned. 
The opinion also repeats that their otperation was 
and could be '·in no manner detrimental'' to the rights 
of the plaintiff, and that, by the change, ''no greater 
burden is imposed upon the common source of supply.'' 
The Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court, which 
had held to the contrary, but reversed it only as to the 
new rights acquired. 
Colorado Milling and Elevator Co. v. Larimer amd 
Weld Irrig·ation Co. (Colo.), 56 P. 185. This case is not 
mentioned in the previous Colorado case, probably for 
the reason, as indicated therein, that no lower rights 
were there affected by the storage. 
In this case, there was a conflict. The irrigation 
company had a right for irrigation prior in time to 
the milling company's right for power purposes. The 
suit by the milling company arose when the irrigation 
company built a dam ·and started to store from its direct 
flow right, and thus affooted the mill right in volume 
and time. 
The Trial Court took the position that the rights of 
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the parties were settled by the former decree, determin-
ing priority. The Supreme Court said that was error, 
that the case presented· a new and different question, 
and reversed it. In a good statement, ·as to appropria-
tions, the opinion hy Judge Gabbert said: 
''The appropriation of water for a specific 
purpose qualified such appropriation by limiting 
the volume to the quantity necessary for that 
pur!pose. Ortma;n v. Dixon, 13 Cal. 33; Kin. Irr., 
Sec. 231; McKinney v. Smith., 21 Cal. 374. An 
appropriator of water from a stre·am already 
partly appropriated acquires a right to the sur-
plus or residuum he appropriates; and those in 
whom prior rights in the same stream are vested 
cannot extend or enlarge their use of water to his 
prejudice, but are limited to their rights as they 
existed when he acquired his (Procbovr v. Jertr 
nings, 6 Nev. 83; Cache La Poud~re Rese.rvoir Oo. 
v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 53 Pac. 331, 25 
Colo ....... ; Kin. Irr., Sees. 230, 232; Water Co. v. 
Pow·ell, 34 Cal. 109), because, in such case, each, 
with respect to his particular appropriation, is 
prior in time and exclusive in right (Water Co. 
v. Powell, supra)." 
And, on the question of storage, it said: 
''The right of diversion by the irrigation 
company for storage purposes did not unquali-
fiedly at~ch under the decree by virtue of which 
it claimed this right. ·This decree did not contem-
plate or provide for such a use. By such diver-
sion, the irrigation company, in effect, sought to 
make another appropriation for another purpose, 
or, if not another appropriation, another use, 
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which 1nay have resulted in the diversion , of 
water in excess of that awarded its ditch, or at 
a tin1e when the water thus taken was not needed 
for the use for which it was originally ruptp·ro-
priated; and although it could change its use from 
that for which it was originally appropriated, 
and for which it was decreed, to another, it could 
not exercise this right in such manner as to in-
fringe on the rights of the plaintiff. * * * 
•' • * * if the evidence established that no 
appropriation had been made by the irrigation 
company for the express purpose of storage, 
which antedated the priority of plaintiff, then, 
although the right of the irrigation company, 
under the decree, to divert water for the purpose 
of irrigation, may have been 1prior to that of 
plaintiff, and by that decree· its right for that 
purpose conclusively settled, it could not thereby 
exercise that right, to the detriment of the latter, 
by an enlarged or another use, measu1J1ed1 by either 
volume or time, which would result in depriving 
plaintiff of its appropriation. * * * 
'' * * * or, otherwise expressed, if the rights 
of the parties alone depended upon the decree, 
then, although the irrigation company could 
change the use of its appropriation from irriga-
tion to that of storage, it could not divert water 
for that punpose, which would result in a diver-
sion measured by either volume or time, to the 
damage of plaintiff, * * *.'' 
New LoveZand, Etc., Irr. Co. v. Con. Home Swpply, 
Et.c., Co. (Colo.), 62 P. 366. This case relates to the 
storage of direct flow waters~ but will probably serve 
here only to point up that the rights for such direct 
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irrigation and for storage are separate and distinct 
rights. 
The plaintiff, having a priority of 1883, started the 
reservoir in 1893 for the purpose of storing in the "non-
irrigating season'' waters which would otherwis,e run 
through its ditch to waste. Defendant's right was sub-
sequent and inferior to the irrigation right of p~aintiff, 
but it started its reservoir for storage in the non-irri-
gating season during,· or prior to, 1889. Both completed 
their reservoirs, and plaintiff claimed the right of prior 
storage, by reason of its !priority of appropriation. The 
Trial Court awarded the storage priorities in the order 
of the initiation of the storage facilities, and the Supreme 
Court sustained the judgment. 
Finiey v. New Cache La Foudre Irr. Oo. (Colo.), 98 
P. 173, is a later 'case than that cited by :Mr. Ethell, and 
which is much more in point here. This was an action 
to establish relativ,e priorities of a number of reservoirs, 
and the question arose be-cause one party, having lower 
storage rights, similar to the storage rights of respon-
dents in Utah Lake, objected to those having upper 
direct irrigation rights, storing the water for later use. 
This was, even though they appeared to store the same 
amount of water at the same time they would have used 
it for irrigation, but did so in order to get a better head 
or greater flow, or use the same a few days later. This, 
the Trial Court held, they would not be permitted to do, 
and the Supreme Court sustained the Trial Court, and, 
in its opinion, said: 
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'• As we g-ather frmn the record before us, 
in1perfeet and indefinite thoug-h it is, it seems 
that appellants are stoc.kholders in 1nutual ditch 
eompanies which have 1nade ruppropriations of 
water from natural streams for immediate irri-
g-ation and, in appropriate proc.eeding-s, have oh-
tained decrees therefor. On or near the lateral 
ditc.hes of appellants are natural depressions, into 
which, when water has been turned by the water 
con1missioner into the main canal during the irri-
gating season, they have heretofore been acc.us-
tomed at impound their pro-rata share in order 
to collect a sufficient head, or there to store tem-
porarily water to be used a few days later in 
irrigatin2,· their lands. In this statutory proceed-
ing, the object of which was to adjudic.ate the 
relative rights of the various reservoirs for stor-
ing water at times when the same was not needed 
at onc.e for irrigation, appellants, solely in virtue 
of their rights as stoc.kholders in these ditc.h 
c.ompanies, seek to obtain priorities for their 
reservoirs as against other reservoirs whic.h have 
made approlpriations for storag-e purposes entire-
ly distinct and separate from appropriations for 
irrigation, and to fill such reservoirs with the 
ditch water when it is turned out to them for 
irrigation in the summer season. In other words, 
appellants seek to convert their appropriation 
for immediate irrigation into one for storage pur- . 
poses, and to get for the latter a priority which 
belongs to them only for the former purpose." 
Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co. 
(Colo.), 98 P. 729. This case involved the relativ;e pri-
orities of a number ·of rights to store water in reservoirs 
in one irrigation district. 
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The particular point of decision that is applicable 
here (p. 7'33, par. 3) arises on a provision ·in the decree 
of the Lower Court that some of the reservoir com-: 
panies might fill their reservoirs twice, provided ''that 
said second filling shall in no manner aff·ect, prejudice 
or injure the rights of junior reservoir appropriators." 
This point is of some importance here because, we 
think, it will appear from the subsequent dis~ussion that 
the refilling of the propos·ed res-ervoir of respondents, 
in whole, or at least in part, cannot and will not be 
prevented or avoided; and, secondly, because of the con-
tention of respondents here that the simpl~e pro:vision 
in an order granting an application that it shall be "sub-
ject to prior rights'' is a sufficient protection. 
In this Colorado case, it was contended that, because 
the statute contained no provision prohibiting a refilling, 
the decree should be sustained. ·The Appellate Court · 
held otherwise, and said: 
''A double filling, in effect, would give two 
priori ti·es of the same date and of the same capa-
city to the s·ame reservoir, on the same single 
apipropriation, which is impossible in fact, and in 
law, and, if allowed, would violate the funda-
mental doctrine of the law of appropriation * * • 
A reservoir appropriation, like that of a canal, 
cannot be made to do double duty.'' 
Williams, et al. v. Altrn.ow, et al. (Or.), 95 P. 200. 
This is the case which Mr. Ethell, in his Article, indi-
cated was against the right to such storage as is here 
sought. Hi's conclusion is correct, in this respect. 
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The ease involYed the storage and claim of right 
of storage by an upper direct flow user to withhold su,ch 
flow for later use. The difference between this and the 
Colorado cas,e, which ~lr. Ethell said resulted in a con-
trary holding, is that, in the Colorado case, no drainage 
rights below appeared to have been affected. It was 
withholding of newly acquired rights, on a river system, 
which would not affect lower us,ers, dependent upon 
drainage. 
This Oregon case, in this respect, is more in point 
here, on the principle decided, although not identiCJal, 
in fact. The def,endant Altnow, hy ·dam (p. 207), ~ut 
off the direct flow of water for about 10 or 15 days, while 
the reservoir was being filled, and at which time the 
plaintiffs had the right to the use of water. 
The water, or at least some of it, had been pre-
viously used for irrigation on the East side of the 
Stream., and the drainage, as the water was used by 
direct flow, was, of course, from this use. By placing 
a dam higher up, he was able to divert wat,er to the 
West side of the Stream, on his higher lands. Thus, the 
former drainage would, necessarily, be affe-cted. 
The defendant was, therefore, enjoined from storing 
and using water from the reservoir on the higher lands, 
West of the Creek. 
It seems plain that the decision here, as based on 
the finding (R. 116) of waste of water from Utah Lake, 
or on alleged waste by Utah Lake users, is erroneous. 
And, furthermore, we have found no case deciding 
that water 1nay be withheld on a direct flow right for 
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later distribution and use, where lower vested rights 
depend upon the drainage from the direct use. 
Note 70 A.L.B. 220, and the case preceding it, deal 
with the question of detention or retardation of water, 
in connection with riparian rights. The principles ap-
plied a;ppear to be about the same. It is held that a 
riparial)- user, for power or for riparian irrigation, may 
retard the water only to raise the head sufficient for his 
own diversion or use, and may not so delay it for later 
use, if such affects other users. It is pointed out (p. 
238) that, in this connection, evaporation and absorption 
are frequently of importance, and it is said (p. 239) that 
"the amount of evaporation caused by the spreading out 
of the water is certainly an important fact, and, taken 
in connection with the size of the stream, may, in some 
cases, be a controlling fact.'' 
POINT II. 
The record disclose»; that the proposed plaw for 
d,iversion and sto,rage would interfere with t.he rights 
of lower users both as to volume and as to time of use. 
{The evidence dJoes wot suppo.rt the findings.) 
The section dealing with change application is 
100-3-3. This s,e~tion provides, as to applications for 
permanent change, that such application ''shall not be 
rejected for the sole reason that such change would 
impair vested rights of others, but, if otherwise proper, 
they may be approved as to part of the water involved, 
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or upon condition that such conflicting rights be ac-
quired.'' 
We call attention particularly to this provision 
because we have nothing here, either in the application 
or in the decree, dealing with ''part of the involved 
water," or dealing with any condition that conflicting 
"rights be acquired." If, therefore, the rights of a:p'Pel-
lants would be in any way interfered with by this oper-
ation, the application should be rejected, in accordance 
with the previous provision of this section that ''no 
such change shall be made if it impairs any vested right 
u·ithout just compervsation. '' 
As pointed out by the opinion of Judge Wolfe (Moyle 
v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. (2) at 895 ), the Engineer has 
discretionary power in the granting of this character of 
application for a permanent change, and there 1s no 
vested right to such .change. This opinion says: 
'' * * * the right to change the place of diver-
sion is not an absolute or vested right, but is only 
a conditional or qualified one. * * * 
"It should be noted that in case of an appli-
cation for a permanent change a.s com;pared to 
a temporary change the procedure shall be the 
same as is provided for in applications to appro-
priate water. * * * The right of the applicant 
is not absolute. The Engineer is required to 
determine certain facts some of which involve 
the element of judgment. In the case of an appli-
cation for a temporary change of use the Engi-
neer 'Sh,all make an order authorizing a change' 
'If such tempo.r:a.ry change does not impair any 
vested rights of others.' The Shurtleff case was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
evidently based largely on the conception of a 
vested right either complete or inchoate as ap ... 
pears from the quoted portion of that case set 
out above. But the word' shall' is used in Section 
100-3-3 only in connection with an application for 
a tempor:ary change of place of diversion or place 
or purpose of use.'' 
Nor does the right or lack of right to such change 
depend upon the quantity of water involved or the extent 
of the injury. The statute does not limit the right to 
object to such change because of these. 
Respondents' only expert witness based his opinion 
that this proposed operation could be feasibly carried 
on without substantial injury to appellants on a premise 
that the amount of water involved was so small. 
As we have pointed out SU[Jffia, if the judgment of 
the District Court in this case can be sustained here, 
it n1ust be sustained in every similar case, and the result 
of this could be devastating as to Utah Lake users, 
and in other similar situations. There are scores of 
such streams draining to the Lake. And there is no 
basis for deciding these cases upon the theory that 
single applications of this kind may not involve an 
amount of water wh~ch, by itself, would cause great 
injury. The application approval cannot be sustained 
here under the statute,.'' if it impairs ·OJYIIY vested right.'' 
It appears, by the ~testimony of all three expert wit-
nesses here that, if this 35 cfs. of water goes down, as it 
has always done, in the high water season when the 
ground is saturated and the water table high, substan-
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tially all of it will reach the Lal\:e; and that it will do 
this after any waters would be spilled from Utah Lake, 
and, also, before the irrigation season withdrawals there-
fronl. The right to have it at this time is important. 
This condition is plainly true 1in averag·e high water 
years such as 1938, and the foregoing 1neasurements show 
that this year was not exceptional. 
On the other hand, it is the testin1ony of each of 
the said expert witnesses that, if. this water is held 
and released in the later, hotter, and drier months of 
from July to October, at least half of it would be lost -
by evaporation and transpiration. Witness Richards, 
for respondent~, so testified (T. 134-135). Witness 
George Earl, for app~:·Uants, so testified (T. 333-339, 
359). And witness Garr\ner, also for appellants, so testi-
fied (T. 210, 213-214). There is no contrary testimony. 
It is also testified, as recited above, that, as the 
Lake water is drawn down by the pumping in this later 
irrigation season from July to October, there is a large 
area, amounting to a mile, or more, of the dry bed of 
the Lake exposed, so that any water running into the 
Lake does not reach the body of water so as to becon1e 
available to the pumps, but is substantially lost. It is 
for this reason that another pumping station was estab-
lished on the West side of the Lake, a considerable dis-
tance below the intake of the Jordan River, and a canal 
has been constructed, and is used to carry the water 
from this Pelican Point pumping plant to the River (T. 
308-309). This plant is for the purpose of draining out 
the lowest part of the Lake. 
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It thus seems obvious that existing rights on the 
Lake would be injured, both as to supply and as to time. 
This seems to he a matter of which this Court may take 
judicial notice. 
Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Vickers, 29 Utah 315, 81 
P. 144. There, the defendant was entitled, by his appro-
priation, to all the water of a creek for 10-day periods 
each month. The Court awarded him about one-third 
of the water every day of the month. It was held that 
the loss through evaporation and seepage of 1 cfs. of 
water running through a ditch is almost as great as if 
3 cfs. were running down. And, that the loss over a 
10-day period is much less than would be the loss from 
a smaller amount of water flowing over the longer period. 
The opinion says : 
''Evidently the evaporation and seepage of 
such a small stream would be such as in great 
part to destroy its efficiency and usefulness. Any 
one who is at all acquainted with the properties 
of water knows that the loss in such a stream by 
evaporation and seepage is proportionately much 
greater than in a stream two or three times its 
size. In fact, it would seem too clear to require 
demonstration by actual test that such loss would 
in the same time be practically as great from the 
smaller stream, flowing in the same ditch, as that 
from the larger one.'' 
This water, released in this later irrigation season, 
and since the waters are used and re-used would obvi-
ously he substantially exhausted. 
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The right of appellants, both as to "quantity and 
tiine,'' would be interfered with. ."\s stated in the Cobo-
.rado ]filling amd Ele~cator• case (56 P. at 187), supra, 
respondents could make no chang-e of their appropria-
tion to that of storage, which, as to appeHants, would 
result in a •' diversion measured by either volttm.e or 
tim e.·' 
It is claimed by respondents here that the portion 
of the "~ater which did reach the Lake in the later season 
would at least to some degree, become available to the 
Lake, even though not utilized until the following season. 
This, of course, subject to losses from the dry Lake bed, 
might be, to son1e extent, true. But, under the law, 
the users on the Lake are entitled to have all the water 
available there at the time that it would be available, 
if allowed to flow in natural course, under est,ablished 
uses. Respondents cannot be made the judges as to how 
or when these peaple, within their rig-hts, may use the 
water they are entitled to use. 
Furthermore, it is clear that, in a great 1nany years, 
it is vital to the primary rig-hts and the adjudicated 
canal rights on the Lake that this water reach the Lake 
during the current irrigation season. This is particularly 
important to them in a low year, because such a year 
may often be, and is, followed by a hig-h water year 
on the Lake, when water mig-ht be required to be spilled; 
in which case, late water, which may have added to the 
storage for the next year, would add nothing to the 
amount of like water available to them in such latter 
year. 
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This situati'Dn becomes clearer, as applied to the 
Copper Company (T. 368) here, and to all like secondary 
users, because these rights can only take water when 
the primary and the adjudicated canal rights are being 
fully met, and if these waters, which may have been us·ed 
in the previous irrigation years, are put in storage 
late in the Fall ~and then water is spilled in February, 
or into March, this late water is lost to these secondary 
users entirely, because the prior rights could cover and 
use all available water. 
We point out, also, that under the change applica-
tion here, the water withheld in any calendar year need 
not be released in that year at all. There is no such 
limitation :provided in, or contemplated by, the applica-
tion. 
Also, it was contended in argument below that the 
flow to the Lake from this later seasonal use might 
be accelerated by the use of the water to irrigate small 
areas of the whole 16,000 acres on which the petition 
recites the direct flow water has been used, and on which, 
it recites, this withheld water will be used. It is not 
indicated how the Engineer would know whose land 
would get it. 
There, again, there is no such provision or limitation 
in the application. The Lower Court simply directed 
the Engineer to approve the application, and pro~eed 
under it. So it, or what may 'Dr must he done under it, 
is not qualified, at all. 
This, and some of the other things referred to under 
this topic, enter also into the next point of discussion. 
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In conclusion of this point, it seems clear on the 
record that this water could not be withheld from the 
way it is wont to flow to the Lake in the wet 8ipring 
season, either directly or by run-off from some use on 
saturated land, without thereby interfering with exist-
ing rights, including the rights of appellants. 
POINT III. 
The pr1oposed ·plarn of dit·ersion, sto'f'lage, arnd distri-
bution (1) ca.n'nol be so administered as to ilns11ffe that 
the rights of lower users will not be injuriously affec-ted, 
and (2) the State Engiweer' s determ.i11Ja.tion that it can-
not be adrninistered so as to ·avoid such injury is con-
trolling, and ( 3) his statutory duty of admirnristration 
cannot arbitr;arily be ,controlled by the Trial Cowrt. 
(The d.ecree is 'YIJOt supported by evidence or findings, 
and is agaimst law.) 
The history of irrigation law has shown a gradual 
change from control by the Courts to control and admin-
istration by qualified State Engineers. Samuel C. W eil 
(author of '' W eil on Water Rights''), in discussing 50 
years of water law in an Article, Harvard Law Rev. 50: 
252-304, described this change, and it would seem now 
to be common knowledge. 
As applicable here, he also points out the necessity 
of the use of return flow of water for irrigation, and 
that public policy requires the greatest possible number 
of re-uses of water. In this connection, it would also 
seem to be common knowledge that irrigation would be 
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very substantially restricted if re-use rights could not 
be firmly established, and then protected. This is the 
purpose and intent of our statutory plan of administra-
tion. 
Dealing with the claim of respondents that they have 
the right to and can administer this water, as was largely 
done when waters were regulated by Court decrees 
alone, this author points out that such administration 
had all the infirmities of ''human conduct, imperfect 
wisdom, defective construction, and lack of good will 
* * *." This autho-r also there points out that, even under 
''impersonal'' control, there are still uncertainties due 
to vagaries of rainfall, snow melting, evaporation, and 
other factors of run-off and of stream flow. 
In 1903, the Legislature of Utah commenced trans-
ferring the control and distribution of waters in this 
State to the State Engineer, and has progressively 
passed additional legislation increasing this control and 
covering all the waters of the State, including, in more 
recent years, the underground waters. We refer to some 
of these Statutes : 
''Administration amd Distribution'' -St~ate Erngineer: 
100-2-1: He shall have had not "less than five years 
experience as a practical engineer * * *,'' and 
''such theoretical knowledge and practical ex-
perience and skill as shall fit him for the 
position." 
''He shall have general administrative super-
vision of the waters of the State, and the 
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measurernent, appropriation, apportionrnent, 
and distribution thereof.'' 
100-2-9: He has been given the power of arrest of any-
body interfering with his administration, and 
100-1-15: n1akes it a misdemeanor for anyone to so inter-
fere. 
100-4-11: This section provides thrut, during a ''general 
adjudication'' or determination of water rights, 
the Engineer shall distribute the water accord-
ing to the then existing decrees. (These waters 
are in the course of such general adjudication 
now.) 
100-5-1: By this section, the State Engineer a;ppoints 
all Water Commissioners ''for the distribu-
tion of water from any river system or water 
source." (Caldwell v. Erickson, 213 P. 182 
(1923), held he had succeeded to right of ap-
pointment of Commissioners to administer 
Court decrees.) 
100-5-3: ''The State Engineer and his duly authorized 
assistants shaH carry into effect the judgments 
of the courts in relation to the division, distri~ 
bution, or use of water under the provisions 
of this title." It further provides that he shall 
divide, or cause to be divided, the water wiithin 
any district created under the provisions of 
of this title, and shall regulate and control the 
same. 
100-5-5: Provides fror his supervision over the construe-
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tion and repair of dams impounding more than 
100 acre feet of water. 
100-5-6: Provides for his examination of any dam or 
diverting works, either on his own initiative 
or upon request of interested parties. 
100-5-7 : Provides for his authotity to inspect di!tches 
or any other diverting works, and to make re-
quirement of changes or alterations. 
100-5-11: Provides that he may make such requirements 
as will prevent waste. 
Change of Use: 
100-3-3: Deals with applications for change. Such ap-
plication should state ''the place, purpose, and 
externt of the present use, and the place, pur-
pose, and extent of the proposed use." It re-
cites: ''The procedure in the State Engineer's 
Office, and the rights and duties of the appli-
cant, with respect to applications for permanent 
changes of point of diversion, place or purpose 
of use, should be the same as provided in this 
title for applications to appropriate water.'' 
100-3-8: Is the section dealing with the approval or 
rejection of applications, either for appropria-
tion or cro(Jll1)ge. It says: 
''It shall be the duty of the ·state engineer, up-
on the payment of the approval fee, to approve an 
application if: * * * ( 2) The proposed use will not 
impair existing rights, or interfere with the more 
beneficial use of the water; (3) The proposed plan 
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i ...... physically a:nd econom.icall.tJ feasible • "" ~; and 
( -!:) The applicant has the financial ability to com-
plete the proposed works and the application was 
filed in good faith and not for purposes of specu-
lation or monopoly; * * * If an application doe-s 
not meet the requirements of this section, it shall 
be rejecte,d.'' 
100-3-10: Provides for the endorsement of a;pprova.l or 
rejection on the application; and, if approved, 
that the State Engineer shall require that ac-
tual construction work must begin within six 
months. 
100-3-17: Provides for a certificate, upon completion of 
an appropriation or permanent change of 
nature of use. It says: ''The certificate shall 
oot extend the rights described in the a.pplica~ 
tion. '' 
In this case, after the hearings before the State 
Engineer, he wrote respondents a preliminary letter (R. 
45 ), suggesting the ;possibility of a compromise arrange-
ment here (100-2-16). He pointed out that the applica-
tion had been changed to insure that no winter waters 
would be stored and that: ''The evidence presented at 
the hearing, together with the general information avail-
able in the office of the State Engineer, detnonstrates that 
the proposed change could interfere substantially with 
the vested rights of others.'' And, also, points out that 
an ''applicant may not enlarge his basic right by the fil-
ing of a change application.'' 
There had heen some discussions as to the possibility 
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of respondents' giving up some water for substitution 
by direct flow to ·compensate for the proposed withhold-
ing and loss. The Engineer, therefore, granted time and 
suggested that the matter o.f attemping to reach a stipu-
lation with the owners of the Utah Lake rights be con-
sidered. 
This ~Toposal was promptly rejected (R. 48), and the 
State Engineer then rendered his decision which, on the 
point under discussion, states the position of the appel-
lants that the proposed change could not he made so as to 
assure that established rights would not be interfered 
with, we quote (R. 54): 
''In part it was contended that the proposed 
change would decrease the contribution from this 
source of supply to Utah Lake. That it would (a) 
change :the time at which 1the waters would reach 
the Lake; (b) increase the amount of water lost 
by transpiration and evaporation; and (c) permit 
the applicant to store waters which it would not 
have used by direCJt flow diversion * * * 
''The evidence presented at the hearing, to-
gether with the general information available in 
the office of the State Engineer, den1onstrates 
that the proposed change could interfere sub-
stantially with the vested rights of others. 
"Whether or not there will be interference 
with rights already established, whether they be 
junior or senior, depends largely upon the manner 
in which the storage is administered by a public 
official acting as Commissioner. In all storages 
like unto the one involved here, i.e., rights in 
Utah Lake, are made up in many instances by the 
difference between that which can be diverted and 
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used and the supply. A direct flow user can only 
use that portion to which his right entitles him 
subject to the vagaries of weather, conditions of 
crops, etc. 
••The approval of the application granting the 
right to store the water represented by flow 
rights would impose upon an administrator the 
obligation of determining, as mentioned herein-
before, when weather condi'tions on the ground 
would or would not permit the use of waters by 
direct diversion in ap'plying it to a beneficial use 
and then when the applicant could or could not, by 
reason of other conditions, use the water in whole 
or in part by direct diversion * * * This deter-
mination fron1 day to day and from thne to time 
would impose a practical impossibility upon an 
administrator * * * it is the State Engineer's duty 
to reject the application, if it is impractical of op-
eration to the end that others would be adversely 
affected thereby, as outlined above.'' 
The respondents' contention on this, as adopted in 
the findings, are: First, that they own and have the 
right to control and administer the waters of American 
Fork Creek (R. 114). A Second contention which has 
been adopted is, in effect, that the Engineer does not 
have discretion to do anything except to grant this, or 
any, application, and recite that it is ''subject to :prior 
rights.'' It will be noticed that 100-3-17 provides that, 
when a certificate is finally issued, it shall be ''subject 
to prior rights." 
The conclusion of the Trial Court was that the '' ap-
proval of the applieation'' would not infringe on vested 
rights, perhaps because water sometimes spills to Jordan 
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River. But, the ''affect'' of such approval, as pointed 
out by the Engineer, is that it would infringe, and this 
has to be considered by him. 
The mere approval, of course, would not affect any-
body; but the operation of the scheme will. One of the 
statutory conditions is that • • the proposed p~am/' be 
feasible~. 
And, as pointed out in the statutes, the question is to 
he determined from hearings and from investigations by 
the State Engineer and information in his office, and 
involves, as this Court has pointed out, matters ''of judg-
ment.'' 
The contention of respondent is that they can control 
and administer the water, and if they, themselves, do not 
properly regulate it, any vested rights affected have their 
remedy in the courts, because the approval is ''subject 
to prior rights;'' that the Engineer is a mere functionary 
to approve applications, and ·without discretion even as 
to the problem of "administrative supervision'' with 
which the statute (100-2-1) charges him. 
It would seem plain that here there could be no such 
remedy, even b:v any multiplicity of suits. And, it also 
should be clear, that this theory, as to administration 
and relief, is exactly contrary to the system of admini-
stration, distribution, and relief, as now set up in the 
statutes. 
It goes without saying that respondents could legally 
store water only at such times as they would have the 
right of immediate beneficial use thereof. Such right 
would depend upon the then conditions of the ground, 
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of the crops, and of the weather. The duties of the State 
Engineer to supervise and prevent waste would r~quire 
him to permit no use, and so, of course, no storage at any 
other time. U nrequired use is the commonest way of 
wasting water. 
This reserToir site is practically inaccessible in the 
'Yinter and early Spring, and would he covered in deep 
snow. Ass1m1ing the dam headgate might be exposed in 
late April, and could be reached at that time, or in May, 
it could be closed only if water was then flowing to the 
Creek, and if respondents then required thiAs water for 
beneficial irrigation. 
If so, and a storm came, as they will at this season, 
and do, blanketing the irrigable area, or causing flash 
floods in the lower canyon, the gate would have to be 
immediately raised, because they could then neither use 
nor store water. But, the gate would then be a day's 
snow-shoe journey away, so that this reservoir would be 
filling up for a time, and, as a practical matter, consider-
able lengths of time, with some water respondents may 
be, and some they would not be, entitled to use. It would 
be impossible to tell how much of each was thus accumu-
lated. 
It should be remembered, also, that, by this applica-
tion, this scheme involves storing and, also, releasing 
water from this ·reservoir for irrigation in the same 
period of time, between April 1st and June 15th. 
No one can set a gate in this reservoir so as to hold 
back water at a rate of 35 cfs., or 15 cfs., or any other 
rate. If it were set so as to permit a flow of, say, 15 cfs. 
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through the gate, no one could then know how much was 
being held hack. 
This is not a case like the Rock;y Ford case, 104 Utah 
202, 135 P. (2) 108, at 110, where the Court can fix the 
amount of flow that one appropriator is entitled to as 
against another, and say that, above a flow of '' 164 cfs., '' 
the additional water may he stored. And, it cannot be 
said that the total amount of 1,000 acre feet, here in-
volved, could be measured in the reservoir, for the reason 
that the gate has to be released from time to time for 
irrigation during the storage period, as above stated; and 
also, to keep the withholding within respondents' water 
rights. A partial or entire refill could not be prevented 
by the Engineer, and certainly would not he by respond-
ents. 
And, furthermore, if the gate were set so that 35 
cfs. could be measured through it by gravity flow, then, 
in the same position, and under pressure of a high head 
of water on the gate, twice that much could well get 
through. And this would he true if it were set for 15 
cfs., or any other rate of flow release, as it may be. 
Again, take a time when there is 300 cfs. down at the 
point of distribution, and assume that there would be a 
period in the high wate:r;· season when respondents would 
be entitled to beneficially use this amount so they with-
hold at the rate of 35 cfs. in the reservoir and use 265 
cfs., how can anyone determine how much of the 35 cfs., 
so withheld, would run off to the Lake promptly, if it had 
not been so withheld~ 
There is no requirement in this application that the 
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water of the reservoir be released in the later irrigation 
season, or in later years, at the rate of 35 cfs.; but, even 
if it were, it is obvious that the same portion would not 
reach the Lake; and, if it were released and spread out 
over 16,000 acres at a. rate of, say, 10 cfs. or 15 cfs., it 
seems quite certain that little, if any, of it would reach 
the Lake. Certainly, it could not he administered so any 
of it would reach the Lake so as to be available for irri-
gation therefrom in the season in which it is withheld by 
respondents. 
There is no provision here, or any proposal, for sub-
stitution or replacement of water by respondents sur-
rendering the same; and, if there were, it seems also that 
it would be utterly impossible for the State Engineer to 
measure the loss that would inevitably occur from the 
storing and releasing of this water in the late season, 
so as to be able to make it up in any way to appellants, 
either in time or volume. 
Even if we assume a situation in which, at a certain 
time, there were 105 cfs. available to respondents, and 
they were to withhold 35 cfs. and turn down directly to 
the Lake 35 cfs., and use 35 cfs. on their land, even 
that simple situation is not free from complications, be-
cause it is impossible to definitely determine how much 
water would promptly reach the Lake, if the 105 cfs. 
were run over the land in the early season. No one can 
measure or determine the difference in Lake inflows 
that this plan would make. 
There are other complications and difficulties that 
the State Engineer must encounter, even within this 
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area of irrigation. For example (R. 112), each of these 
respondents is entitled to a different portion of the water 
in the withholding period of the applieation, from that in 
the period in which the water would be released. Pleasant 
Grove, for instanee (R. 112), in April, would be entitled 
to one-fourth of the water; from July to September, 
about one-fifth; and, in September, about one-fifteenth. 
Similar variations oecur as to both American Fork and 
Lehi, Lehi being entitled to one-sixth in April and to one-
third from July to Septembe-r. 
And, perhaps a more serious eomplication arises in 
connection with those having right to use which are 
secondary to those of the three respondents. These users' 
rights (R. 35-36, 37, 81-83) have been supplied only dur-
ing the high water supply, so that water withheld 
in this period and released in smaller portions and with 
a low supply of water would not be available to supply 
the right of these users, at all. 
There is always the problem, too, of maintaining 
the even flow required by the stipulation wilth the Power 
Company (R. 108). 
There just isn't any practical or, for that matter, 
any possible way of determining the extent of the affect, 
of this proposed scheme upon Utah Lake rights. It should 
be obvious that, if the operation of the plan is left to 
respondents, as it cannot legally be left, they would oper-
ate it, of course, hut it would so operate that they would 
get the whole amount of the water covered by this appli-
catron, additional to the right that they have already got. 
They could get more by refilling. They would, thus, make 
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this anwunt of water do double duty, contrary to law, 
a~ well a~ injuring the Lake rights, contrary to law. 
\Y e do not suggest that they need act dishonestly in 
doing thi~. but they could not be expected to exercise the 
diligence and pay the expense of even atten1pting the 
impossible adjustn1ents hnposed here; and they would, 
by a change application, get all the additional water this 
reservoir can be made to supply. 
The record shows ( T. 82) that once the Commis-
sioner did ask, when the Pleasant Grove ditch was full 
to capacity, that some be turned to the Lake. None was 
turned. It should be noted that, no matter what the law 
may say, these respondents think we have no rights, at 
all, as to American Fork Creek. 
After the respondents had put in their case on this 
question of practicability or feasibility of administration, 
and after the appellants had put in their case, respond-
ents put their expert back on the stand to a~tempt to offer 
something as to how this plan might be operated (T. 384-
395). 
If this statement is carefully analyzed, it will be 
found that it amounts to no more than a statement that, 
if this was only a matter of holding back a quantity of 
water by a group of users, according to their rights, and 
the releasing of it to them later, by agreement as to how 
it might be used, they might he able ·to operate it. This 
is described as a common method. And, in connection 
with it, Ex. "EE" was introduced. 
It entirely ignores the affect on lower vested rights. 
The expert's statement does not clear up any of the 
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difficulties hereinabove, or by the Engineer, cited. In 
order to escape the fact that water may also be released 
in the period 'of storage, he has the water stored in 
April; whereas it is alleged (R. 9), and contended 
throughout, that the storage is to be in the high water 
season. However, this witness calculates, and on this he 
seems to be correct, that in May and June 65% of the 
entire yearly flow comes down. That is when they want 
to take it, and that is when we naturally get it. 
He assumes releasing it in the month following the 
storage, (July), although this is not required or con-
templated by the application. Also, the use of it on a 
small portion of the land, although this the Engineer 
would not be permitted to do in administering this appli-
cation. He talks of releasing it with a substantial amount 
of additional water; whereas respondents allege that the 
entire flow of American Fork Creek, in the season of 
later release, does not exceed 30 cfs.-about 10 cfs. to 
each respondent (R. 7). He assumes, throughout, that 
the respondents, when the water was sufficient, would 
be entitled to use all that their ditches would hold, re-
gardless of the need of it for beneficial use, at the time, 
and not withstanding this, admits that, even under the 
situation which he passes upon, there would still be diffi-
culties (T. 393). 
Admittedly, the conclusions are based on many ''as-
sumptions," but the Engineer has to go by the law and 
the terms of this application. 
Respondents sugg·est that we can go to Court, at any 
time or times they do not operate it so as not to add any-
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thing to their rights, or subtract anything from ours. 
But how, and when, and by what possibility of proof, 
as to definite violations, or the extent of eff.ect thereof, 
or druuages therefrom Y 
This is a situation such as our statutes, inliposing the 
duties of distribution upon the Engineer, are now in-
tended to prevent. How could we be at this reservoir 
site, and at the point of distribution, at all times, to know 
just what was being done, or to determine and prove how 
much water was required for beneficial use 1 Or how 
much more was used, or the damage to any user thereby1 
The whole thing is not the right or function of either 
the appellants or the respondents here. It is the statutory 
duty of the State Engineer. 
And, how Inany law suits would it tak~, by all the 
different users on the Lake, and how could the extent of 
the damage by any of the acts he determined, or the 
liability for such acts fixed 1 It is not the policy of the 
Courts, as we understand it, to promote such a multi-
plicity of litigation. 
State Engineer's Discretion: 
Can the Trial Court compel the State Engineer to 
approve and put this kind of operation into effect, when 
the statute places the entire duty and responsibility of 
controlling and administering it upon him-or compel 
the State Engineer to undertake such an administration 
when he has reasona:bly determined that he cannot ad-
minister it s·o as to prevent violations of the statute, and 
of the vested rights of water users 1 
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This character of withholding, and these resulting 
questrons, are novel in this State. 
'The claim, however, as to the right of the respond-
ents to, themselves, set up and operate the proposed plan, 
is sufficiently and negatively answered by the statutes. 
On the general question, we have cited the cases that 
have been found, supra; and, in every case where there 
were existing lower rights, dependent on run-off, it has 
been held, as a matter of substantive law, that such with-
holding from a direct irrigation right is not permissible. 
Weil on W,ater Rights, p. 556, referring to the Colo-
rado cases, says : 
''This, in Colorado, is sometimes phrased by 
saying that a priority 'cannot he made to do 
double duty,' meaning, apparently, that cumula-
tive purposes of use, whereby the water is used 
over again before discharge from control, cannot 
he made to the injury of others. Having appro-
priated water only for actual irrigation in the irri-
gation season, it cannot he so used and also stored 
in 'the non-irrigating season, which is said to make 
the priority do 'double duty.' " 
These cases, however, do not decide the question of 
control by the Court of the Engineer's judgment and dis-
cretion on matters such as are here involved. 
This precise question has not been directly decided 
here, or in any Court, so far as as we know. Nor has the 
question as to what weight shall be given to the Engi-
neer's decision or judgment, as to what can be admini-
stratively done in this kind of situation. The statute 
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quoted supra does indicate that, if he detennines that the 
"plan" is not feasible, it is his duty to reject the appli-
cation by which the plan is to be initiated. 
His field of knowledge, in considering applications, 
is, under the statute, much broader than the Court's 
because he can rely upon his investigation and the ac-
cumulated information in h:ls office, as well as the evi-
dence. 
In general, such applications require, as has been 
said supra, elements of judgment, and, in any applica-
tion resembling the one here, it is necessarily required 
that a judgment in advance be reached, as to what will 
be the "effect" of the application. So, the statute re-
quires that this judgment, on the part of the State Engi-
neer, shall be by one having not only an expert Engi-
neer's study and training, but, at least five years of 
practical experience. 
And, the character of application here involved 
differs substantially from one to appropriate water, and 
from the usual application to change the point of diver-
sion. The effect of these have no foreseeable administra-
tive problem. 
As to the former, our Courts have held that the ap-
plication shall be granted, if it is reasonably probable 
that unappropriated waters may become available. This, 
ordinarily, can do little hann, either way, because the 
waters of the system are measured to the prior owners, 
and, if none is left over, the applicant gets none, and no 
harm is done. Ordinarily, no expensive investments are 
involved, and, if these are anticipated, tests and measure-
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ments can usually pre-determine if water may actually 
be available. 
The question of expensive outlay, which may be 
wholly lost to the water users, as presented here, makes 
this situation different. And, in any event, it presents 
a complicated adrninistrative problem, not generally in-
volved. So that we have here presented a new and far-
reaching question. 
In view of the new and increasing number of appli-
cations for such change of nature of use, by withholding 
water used for immediate irrigation, this question be-
comes one of great importance to water users of the 
State, and particularly to the State Engineer. Even the 
expense to his office, of placing the required number of 
Commissioners on these operatior;ts, alone, is a matter of 
grave consequence to the Engineer. On the number of 
applications of this character now pending, this would be 
prohibitive. There are others on Utah Lake sources, 
as well as several on the Sevier River drainage sources. 
As stated above, this Court can take notice of these. 
The Problem is One of F'tact, No·t of Law: 
The point of conflict is whether the scheme of opera-
tion involved can feasibly, practicably, or possibly be 
administered so as to protect existing rights. This ad-
ministration, as the Engineer said, is the ''effect'' of 
approval of the application, as now ordered. 
The need of administrative supervision, and by 
trained experts, is more apparent in this field than in 
almost any of the other fields of state administration, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63 
and where the authorities have said that the Courts may 
not control the discretion of executive officers; either (1) 
in the determination of factual matters within their juris-
diction, or (2) in discharging their executive duties. 
It seen1s to us that all of the arrangements, factors, 
measurements. and considerations that enter into the 
question of administration and distribution of waters are 
n1atters of factual, and not legal, import. And, also, that 
this question of possibility or impossibility of administra-
tion, is a practical one, and its determination is for the 
expert administrative officer, and not for the Courts. 
However, the Trial Court has, in effect, said that the 
Engineer shall approve a plan, the effect of which would 
be to require him to do what appears can't he done. And, 
since it could legally he done only if the Engineer could 
undertake and do it, it must be assumed that it won't be 
done at all. And so, existing rights necessarily will be 
changed, and interfered with. 
No one would contend, we think, that a Court could 
take over and direct any distribution job by the Engineer. 
Nor do we see how it could rightly be done in this indirect 
way. 
If this were a typical case, as we have .pointed out, 
where the Court were acting in judicial determination 
of rights, and had, for example, said that "X" is entitled 
to 25 cfs. from this source, and, when his right is being 
supplied, the balance shall go to "Y," and shall he di-
verted at his new or changed point of diversion, the 
right of the Court and the duty of the Engineer would 'be 
clear. 
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Or, even if the Court had found, as to the Engineer's 
findings of non-feasibility or impracticability ·or im-
possibility, that the Engineer had acted capriciously, 
in that he, if he would, could administer this operation, 
by doing certain things, or doing it in some way, such 
as the Court might think possrble, it would have either 
settled the matter or have presented something for con-
sideration here. 
But the Trial Court merely entered conclusions (R. 
116) ''That: The diversion and storage applied for 
would be possible and feasible of administration from the 
standpoint of use by plaintiffs, and from the standpoint 
of the protection of the rights of the defendants and 
other Utah Lake interests, and that the administration of 
said change is practicable.'' (This, incidentally, follows 
the finding thaJt large quantities of water have, at times, 
been spilled from Utah Lake to Great Salt Lake.) 
And then, the Court ordered that the Engineer rein-
state the application, and proceed with the proposed 
plan, without anything to inform, or guide, or enable him 
to do so. So that, at most, there is only a difference of 
opinion between the Oourt's conclusions, based on no 
findings, and the decision of the Engineer, in which a 
basis, at least, for his decision and his different con-
clusion is recited. This basis is not challenged by any 
factual findings. 
We think that, even if the respondents had offered, 
and the Court had heard, any facts to contradict the 
Engineer's findings, and had then made contrary ones, 
this Court, under the law, would have sustained the 
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Engineer's finding on this factual adn1inistrative ques-
tion. ~-\nd, on the principles of law, cited infra, there is 
greater reason for now doing so. 
We do not question the proposition that the decision 
of questions of law in a proceeding of this kind is for, 
and within, the judicial powers of the Court, nor that 
the determination of the finality of rights to the use of 
waters belongs to the Courts. These matters have been 
decided by this and other Courts rather frequently. 
\Y e point out, however, that, while the right to the 
use of water is a vested right, as quoted above (176 P. (2) 
at 895), there is no vested right to the change here sought. 
(See also, U. S. et al v. Caldwell, 231 P. 434, at 439.) 
Garrison v. Davis, 88 Utah 358, 54 P. (2.) 439, at 443, 
is a case in which this Court makes some reference to the 
weight to be given to a recommendation by the State 
Engineer. While this was a general adjudication suit, 
in which the determination of water rights was directly 
involved, this Oourt, with reference to the recommenda-
tions of the State Engineer, said: 
''While it may be that the trial court was 
not bound to accept such recommendation, still, in 
the light of the fact that the State Engineer col-
lected the information which formed the basis of 
the decree, the recommendation of the State Engi-
neer was entitled to gtreat weight." 
The recommendation of the Stat8 Engineer was that 
the Court retain a rather general jurisdiction for five 
years. This was clearly within the Court's judicial 
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field, while here, the Engineer's decision is in his ad-
ministrative field. 
The Court, there, in substantial disregard of this 
recommendation, retained jurisdiction to ma:ke only 
''minor corrections.'' The Trial Court had held that the 
determination of a priority was not minor, and could be 
considered, but this Court reversed that decision, and 
was apparently influenced, to some extent at least, by 
tthe ~onsidera:tions aborve quoted. 
The foregoing case also held that this Court, in 
deciding that matter, could examine and consider the 
opinion of the State Engineer for his views. The Engi-
neer's opinion here is before the Court, both by pleading 
(R. 53) and as evidence (Ex. "12"). 
This review is pursuant to 100-3-15, which provides 
that the hearing in the District Court shall ''proceed as a 
trial de nova," and as a case in equity. This was urged 
and apparently interpreted below as disposing of all the 
questions now presented, including the power of the 
Court to impose a new State administrative policy-in the 
matter of withholding and distribution of water, and, 
also, to pass upon the possibility or feasibility of the 
administration, necessarily imposed by this policy; the 
theory being that no separation of judicial or admini-
strative functions is involved; and that, since the Engi-
neer is required to simply grant such applications sub-
ject to prior rights, the whole problem is very simple. 
The meaning and- scope of ''trial de nova,'' in this 
water statute, has not heen directly defined by this Court. 
The meaning, as used in the State Utility Acts, will be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
67 
referred to later. The dictionary definition of ''de nova" 
i~ "anew.'· and it would be reasonable to expect that a 
trial in equity was intended to cover judicial examina~ 
tion of the issues of law and, also, to consider the facts; 
at least, the determination of any existing factual condi-
tions nece~sary in determining the legal questions in-
volved. 
The definitions of "de no,va," as used in statutes 
( \Y ords and Phrases), are not numerous, and they lead 
to the conclusion that, on appeal from Justice's or in-
ferior Courts, the term means a ''new trial,'' as if none 
had been had before. In such appeals, there is, of course, 
no question of investigation or determination by an ad-
Ininistrative official or board. 
It also appears that the statutes have used the term 
"trial de nova" in industrial compensation and similar 
cases, where the review is on evidence before a quasi ad-
ministrative board. It is usually held that it is intended 
that the new trial be upon the same issues. 
Our statute on the question of this character of re-
view differs from the statutes of most of the other States, 
in that it contains no stated provision as to what ques-
tions the Trial Court shall decide, and what the Court 
may do with the Engineer's decision. 
For example: The California statute on appeal and 
review of the determination by the water board on appli-
cation to appropriate water provides that the reviewing 
Trial Court may enter a judgment ''affirming, modify-
ing, or reversing" the board. (Deering Gen. Latws, 1931, 
ACt 9091). 
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It is important here to point out, also, as indicated 
in the following cases, that this Court has held that the 
reviewing Court may not set up its judgment and deter-
mination as to future procedure by the applicant, in 
pursuing or perfecting an application to approtp~iate 
water. 
Whitmore v. Welsh, 201 P. (2) 954. In this case, and 
on review of an application to appropriate, the Trial 
Court, in deciding that the application should be granted, 
made it subject to the condition that the rights of another 
applicant, not directly involved in the suit, should be first 
determined. The Court held that the insertion of this 
condition in the judgment was ''unwarranted.'' 
Also, to make the point of return on the application 
come above the contestant's point of diversion, the Engi-
neer had imposed a change upstream from the point of 
return recited in the application. On this, the Court said: 
"The only condition which the State Engineer 
had authority to attach to approval of the Welsh 
application, was that the point of return be far 
enough upstream from the Whitmore diversion 
point to avoid a conflict. The District Court 
oould impose rvo conditiorns other than those which 
the St·ate Engineer had authority to impose." 
This would tend to indicate that, if in the present 
case the :State Engineer,/ in passing upon the administra-
tive problem, had decided that the plan was possible of 
administration, if certain conditions were imposed, this 
might be within his province; and, if it were, the Court 
could not impose other or different conditions. 
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In Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. (2) 882, at 895, as 
we have already pointed out, the opinion of Judge Wolfe 
there says: 
'• The right o.f the applicant is not absolute. 
The Engineer is required to determine certain 
facts, some of which involve the element of judg-
ment." 
Rocky Ford Irr. Oo. v. Kent Lakes Res. Co., 135 P. 
(2) 108. Reference there is made (p. 113) that, on review 
trial, the District Court found, on conflicting evidence, 
that there was unappropriated water, and so based its 
judgment that the application was rightly granted. The 
Engineer had so found. This is an example of determina-
tion of fact, for the purpose of exercising the judicial 
function. 
This same case involved a transfer of reservoir stor-
age, and it was contended that the Court should have 
made some order with relation to the construction of the 
proposed reservoir, and its sup€rvision, matters with 
which the statutes charged the State Engineer. On this 
contention, this Court said: 
"The Court correctly refused to supervise or 
limit the type of dam to be built at Three Creeks.'' 
E,ardley v. Terry, 77 P. (2) 362. This case contains 
a more definite decision hy this Court as to the division 
of the administrative and judicial functions. The Engi-
neer had denied the application to appropriate water. 
However, the duly appointed Water Commissioner, for 
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his office, testified at the Trial to the general effect that 
it was probable that public water had been or could be 
developed. The Court, in accordance with previous de-
cisions on this, therefore, held, as a matter of law, that 
the application should have been granted. 
The Court, however, went further, and recited that 
the development had been without injury to the rights 
of the protestants, or what was beneficially required by 
them, and entered a decree allowing the applicant to 
trench a;bove protestanJts' point of diversion, and without 
injury to them, to develop water to which he should have 
a right, thus entering the practical administrative field. 
Such findings were eliminated hy this Court, on the 
ground that the Trial Court could determine only the 
question as to whether the application should he granted, 
and that, in determining that question, ''the Court stands 
in the same position as the State Engineer.'' That future 
questions, leading possibly to a certification of a final 
right, including the matters decided by the Court, and 
which were stricken, were matters to be consiqered by 
the State Engineer under the statute::; relating to these. 
Directly on Sec. 100-3-14, and the "duty of. the Court 
to try the case de nov·a,'' this Court said that this statute 
did not stand alone, and was to he considered with the 
other statuteis dealing with the matters involved. And, in 
effect, that "trial de nova" did not permit the Court to 
determine questions involving other statutes, giving 
duties of determination to the State Engineer. This ap-
pears to have application here, under the statutory 
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duties of the State Engineer as to administrative ques-
tions, which haYe been set out above. 
Thus, we contend, the other statutes relating to the 
administrative duties of the Engineer must be given ef-
fect, as to this application. 
Tanner v. Humphreys, State Engineer, 48 P. (2) 484. 
This case dealt wilth an application for change o.f place· o.f 
diversion. This C<>urt held that the change could possibly 
be made ''ithout injury to vested right, and sent the case 
back to the Trial Court. At Page 488, it quotes from a 
Colorado case, as follows : 
"If the change is made, it disturbs the ex-
isting order and manner of distributing water 
diverted from our natural streams into irrigating 
ditches, 1rhich is performed by public offvcers, and 
causes a modification to be made in the general 
adjudication decree. It is fitting that a party who 
asks such relief shall bear the burden of proving 
that the vested rights of others will not thereby 
be infringed if it is granted. It is only the burden 
which is usually imposed upon the moving party 
in a law suit." 
Denver & R. G. W. RR. Co., et al v. Public Service 
Commission et al., 100 P. (2) 552. We will discuss this 
case here because, as mentioned above, it contains a dis-
cussion of trial de novo, and als·o introduces the question 
as to what matters are for decision by the judicial depart-
ment of Government, and what matters are for decision 
by the administrative department of Government, under 
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the separation of powers, as contained in the Constitu-
tion. 
On the first rnatter, the case points out that, under 
the authorities, a trial de nova may mean an entirely new 
trial, without reference to a previous hearing, or a trial 
upon the record, or some portions of the record, made 
in the previous hearing. It held that, in the case of an 
appeal from a determination of the Public Service Com-
mission, granting or withholding a contract carrier's ap-
plication, although the statutes said that the "hearing 
in this District Court should proceed as a trial de nova,'' 
such trial should proceed upon the record of evidence, as 
made in the Commission hearing. Judge \Volfe dis-
sented, as to this. 
The decision of the Court also pointed out that, 
where the appeal was, by the statute, made to review the 
decision, as under 100-3-14, in which the appeal is speci-
fically referred to as "a review" of the Engineer's de-
cision, it must be treated as having a "meaning con-
sistent with the continued existen~e of that which is to 
be again examined or studied.'' That it could not be 
treated as if that proceeding no longer existed. 
However, the questions that may be determined by 
the judicial or by the executive departments of the State, 
and the extent to which the Courts may control the execu-
tive branch, do not appear to depend upon the nature of 
the review proceedings. That is a separate question here. 
The close point is whether the Court can control the 
dete,rmination of the practicability or possibility of ad-
ministering a plan, the administration ·of which the legis-
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lative department in1posed upon the Engineer; and, also, 
whether the Courts should attempt to exercise such con-
trol. 
Judge 'Yolfe, in his dissenting opinion, discusses 
(p. 556) this question of division of powers and of duties, 
and cites a ntunber of authorities. 'Ve agree with this 
discussion, as to overlapping duties which the increase 
of '• administrative government'' has created. (See Tite 
'r. State Tax Comm., 57 P. (2) 734 for a full discussion of 
this.) 'Ye agree, also, as to the clarity of our constitu-
tional provision, and the in1portance of the use of the 
words '• any interference,'' therein. We note, also, the 
statement: 
"But as has been many times reiterated by 
the Courts : It is not the function of the Courts 
to set aside an arrangement made by the Legis-
lature, unless it is a clear and flagrant violation of 
the principle of separation of powers.'' 
The opinion also approves the following quotation 
from Willoughby on the C onstituti!on, Vol. 2, Sec. 7 43, as 
follows: 
''Generally speaking, it Inay be said that, 
when a power is not peculiarly and distinctively 
legislative, executive, or judicial, it is within the 
authority of the Legislature to determine where 
its exercise should be vested.'' 
The opinion of Judge Wolfe, in this case ( p. 560), 
also cites an Article-19 .Minn. Law Rev. 261, by Ray A. 
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Brown, Prof. of Law, U. of Wis.-on the matter of ad-
ministrative officers and the Courts. 
1This writer, as do others, discusses the increase in 
administrative government to meet developing situations, 
but analyzes the matter mainly from the standpoint of 
extent o.f encroachments thereby, of administrative acts 
upon the former judicial functions. 
There appear to 'be fewer discussions of the opposite 
question, as to what extent the Courts, on review, may 
control the executive officers, or boards, in the exercise 
of their legislatively imposed administrative duties, 
under the constitutional separation of .powers. 
This author, in discussing the reasons for increased 
delegation of governmental functions to executive offi-
cers, says (p. 262) : 
''In many instances, the subject matter of" the 
regulation required for its administration a spe-
cialized knowledge much more in the competence 
of the particularly trained and experienced ex-
perts in the field than in that of the judges of our 
customary courts, whose knowledge was· neces-
sarily much more diffuse.'' 
And he also says ( p. 282) : 
''In a large class of cases the non-judicial 
determination of controversies is sustained on the 
ground that the subject thereof is a matter of 
privilege, and not of right.'' 
The determination by public officials of water rights 
and priorities is referred to 'briefly (p. 298), and it is 
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pointed out that the statutes on this provide for Court 
review in various ways. 
The exact question, as we have it here, a.s ~o what 
may be reviewed, or on what matters the Court may re-
verse an executive officer's determination is not ana-
lyzed. Fron1 the authorities that we have cited, and the 
articles exan1ined, however, these thing·s appear to be 
established : 
1. The duty to control and administer the distribu-
tion of the waters of the State involves the expert deter-
mination of the questions of practicability, possibility, 
or feasibility under the different circumstances arising. 
2. That these are such administrative duties as 
may, by the legislative department, be imposed upon an 
official of the executive department, and that this has 
been done. 
3. It follows that, standing alone, such duties may 
be legally exercised by the Engineer, without the neces-
sity of providing for any Court review. And, if they be-
. come involved in such review, under the general provi-
sions therefor, the Court cannot, or certainly should 
not, assume to change such determinations to the judicial 
field of decision. That judicial interference or reversal, 
based on this question, is not justified. , 
4. It also appears here that, if the reversal by the 
Trial Court was not solely on the basis of finding that 
surplus water had, at times, spilled from Utah Lake, then 
it had to be on the basis of disagreement between the 
Court and the Engineer, as to this administrative matter. 
We believe the authorities, above cited, establish that 
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the Court could not substitute its views for those of the 
Engineer, on this. 
Admittedly, the determination of .priority of water 
rights is for the Courts, but this is not involved, nor is 
there any question of fraud or abuse of discretion in-
volved here. On the other hand, a ~hange of nature of use 
is not an unconditional right it is a privilege, which could 
here be justified only if the discharge of many compli-
cated administrative pr9blems and difficulties would pre-
vent interference with other rights. Such matters, as 
these, have, by the Legislature, been delegated to the 
Engineer. 
It would be impracticable to review all the decisions 
of this Court which discuss the effect or weight to be 
given to determinations of questions by administrative 
officers or boards, to which the Legislature has commit-
ted some measure of determination. Some of these are 
annotated under Sec. 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, an~ 
others, under the various sections defining the powers 
of the various boards and officers. 
As we have pointed out above, the State Engineer is 
required to he an expert. We have in mind one other ex-
ecutive officer in the State of Utah who is required to 
be an expert in order to be entitled to be appointed. We 
refer to the State Bank Commissioner. He is required 
(7-1-1) to have at least four years experience in banking; 
and in dealing with functions to which he is appointed, 
and to acts which he could do only "with the approval" 
of the District Court. 'This Court has said: 
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"In the exercise of such power, the Court 
howeYer, 1nay not, as in case of receiver or other 
officer subject to its orders and direction, set 
up his 1nere judgrnent against that of the Bank 
Conunissioner * * *'' (8t. Bank, of Milbard Co. v. 
Hadlock, 30 P. (2) 211, 215). 
And, this Court also said, in the matter of fixing 
compensation of examiners in liquidation, subject to ap-
proval of the Court, that the Bank Commissioner ''is not 
a mere factotem," and "the Court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the Bank Commissioner." (In Re 
Provo Com. Bk., 81 P. (2) 644, 647.) 
And, in a matter of liquidation, this Court said it 
would presume that the Commissioner will liquidate it 
according to law. (Lustig v. Intermt. Bldg. Assn., 123 P. 
(2) 707, 709.) 
This Court has pointed out that the similar proce-
dures for judicial review of orders of the Securities Com-
mission (82-1-41), and the Department of Registration 
(79-1-36), are to the effect that aggrieved parties may 
institute actions in the District Court for review. And 
has said, as to these, that the Court ''shall determine as 
on an appeal in equity, whether the findings * * * are 
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence,'' 
and not as on a review of a determination by the Indus-
trial Commission, whether there is ''any substantial evi-
dence to support such findings." (Gibbs v. Manson, 129 
P. (2) 887, 890.) 
Again, in a matter involving an order of the Public 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78 
Service Commission, denying an application for truck 
company's certificate, the Court said: 
''It has 'been repeatedly held that a review of 
the Commission's order is limited to a determina-
tion of whether the Commission acted within the 
scope of its authority, whether the order has any 
substantial foundation in the evidence, and 
whether any substantial right has been infringed 
by such order." (Mulchary v. Commission, 117 P. 
[2] 298, 299.) 
This Court has also said, in dealing with the In-
dustrial Commission, but not on a matter of the amount 
of compensation, in which matter the statute limits the 
Court, but in the determination of the question of the 
cause of death, that a question of law was presented, 
when it is found that the Commission could only arrive 
at one conclusion from the evidence, and that it found 
contrary to that inevitable conclusion. That a conflict of 
evidence was for the Commission to resolve, and that 
''great respect will be accorded the findings of the Com-
mission in that regard." (Norris v. Commission. 61 P. 
[2] 413, 416.) 
Most of the foregoing cases point out that matters, 
pertaining to legal rights or any other purely judicial 
questions, are for the Cou:rtts ; and the Court in dealing 
with the Securities Commission and its determination as 
to the registration of securities, said: 
''The Commission is not a Court, although 
exercising quasi-judicial functions, but is an ad-
ministrative board, exercising on behalf of the 
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State the regulatory powers authorized ·by the 
Act." (In Re Deseret Mortuary Co., 3 P. [2] 267, 
270). 
This a:bout indicates the situation of the State Engi-
neer, in relation to the administrative functions involved. 
A determination of the problem calls for a more 
extended consideration of the law, as to the division of 
powers between the departments of Government. 
Art. Y, Sec. 1, of the State Constitution, says: 
''The powers of the Government of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the J u-
dicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers :properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments, shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted.'' 
Discussing this question, 42Am. Jur. contains the fol-
lowing statements under "Public Administrative Law," 
which are applicable: 
Page 564: 
''Sec. 191. JUDICIAL AND NON JUDI-
CIAL POWERS COMPARED AND CON-
TRASTED. In determining whether a statute 
providing for judicial review of administrative 
determinations contravenes the principles of sepa-
ration of powers, it is necessary to distinguish 
between judicial functions which can, and nonjudi-
cial functions which cannot, be conferred upon a 
court vested with judicial powers only. The con-
trolling question is whether the function to be 
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exercised by the court is a judicial one, and if it 
is, its c.hJat"~aC'ter is wo·t affected by the fact that the 
proceeding is an aprpeal frrorn am administrative 
body, as distinguished from a suit for an injunC-
tion to set aside or restrain enforcement of the 
determination, nor by the fact that the admini-
strative determination itself is of a legislative 
character, nor by the fact that the proceeding 
is not de novro. * * * 
'' * * * A statute which provides or permits a 
court to revise the discretion of a commission in 
a legislative matter by considering the evidence 
and full record of the case, and entering the order 
it deems the commission ought to have made, is 
invalid as an attempt to confer legislative powers 
upon the co11Jrts. A statute conferring a power to 
review nonjudicial determinations of an admini-
strative body is not valid where the reviewing 
power is limited to questions of law which are the 
appopriate subject of judicial determination, 
particularly where the review provided is not die 
novo but is in the nature of certiora.ri and limited 
by the record made before the administrative 
body. Thus, statutes reposing a .power of review 
in courts are valid where the review is limited to 
matters such as whether the administrative 
authority has acted within the limits of its author-
ity and proceeded according to law, or has viola-
ted any rights secured by the Federal or a state 
Constitution, or whether or not the administra-
tive determination is supported by evidence, or is 
arbitrary." 
Page 601: 
''Sec. 206. GENERALLY. In situations in 
whi:ch judicial relief from or review of administra-
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tive- action is available, the problen1 of the scope 
and extent of the judicial review arises and pre-
sent~ the questions as to what matters are open 
to review and what inquiry the courts will make 
in reviewing particular matters. It is with this 
problem that this subdivision of the article deals 
• • • Generally, judicial review of administrative 
orders is limited to determining whether errors of 
law have been con1mitted. In many cases, how-
ever, particular factors are present which may 
vary the scope of review in smne instances from 
that accorded under the general standards. Both 
the judicial and the statutory standards as to the 
scope of judicial review leave with the courts con-
siderable opportunity for choice and self-restraint 
in appl3ing the standards to specific cases. The 
standards are not objective, but require the exer-
cise of judgment in a field where differences of 
opinion are common and frequently reason-
able* * * 
''In creating administrative agencies and en-
dowing them with certain powers, the legislative 
usually prescribes a certain policy to be admini-
stered by the administrative authority.'' 
Page 602: 
"Sec. 207. PARTICULAR FACTORS AF-
FECTING SCOPE OF REVIEW. In attempt-
ing to determine the scope and extent of judicial 
review of administrative action, certain guides in 
the language of the courts are met with grea;t fre-
quency and in a multitude of different applica-
tions, and these guides may be termed the general 
standards of review. * * * 
"The scope and extent of review may he af-
fected by factors inherent in the nature and char-
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acteristics of the particular remedy 'by which re-
view is sought, so· that if one remedy rather than 
- -. another is chosen, the power of the court to in-
quire into the determination will hH different; or 
it may depend, at least in part, upon the particulwr 
nature oif the function; exercised, by the admini-
strative tribunal, whether judicial, legislative, ad-
ministrative, or executive, however vague the dis-
tinctions between such function, * * * 
Page 605: 
''8ec. 208. FACT 0 R S RESTRICTING 
SCOPE OF REVIEW. Various factors may nar-
row the scope and extent of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action and, conversely, broaden the 
area in which the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion is immune from judicial control. * * * 
''The nature of a controversy as involving a 
matter of privilege as distinguished from a matter 
of right may also tend to narrow the scope and 
extent of judicial review and to extend the area 
of administrwtive 'discretion, as where an adminis-
trative agency adopts rules and regulations with 
respect to the enforcement of the liquor laws, 
or refuse-s to grant, or revokes, a license, :or re-
fuses to admit aliens into this country. The power 
bestowed upon the Secretary of ·the Treasury to 
remit penalties under the revenue laws is not a 
judicial one, but one of mercy to mitigate the 
severity of' the law. The exercise of the power 
is -a matter of his discretion alone, from which 
there· can be no -appeal.'' 
Page 610: 
"Sec. 209. GENERALLY. In general, in 
the absence of valid statutory provisions or other 
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factors affecting tl1e scope and extent of judicial 
review, adn1inistrative deter1uinations \vill not be 
interfered with by the courts unless, but will be 
interfered with where, the determination is be-
yond the powers whirh could constitutionally he 
vested in or exercised by an administrative 
authority; the determination if without or in ex-
cess of the statutory powers and jurisdiction of 
the adJninistrative authority, the determination 
is an exercise of power so arbitary or unreason-
able as virtually to transcend the authority con-
ferred, or is otherwise an abuse of discretion, or is 
in disregard of the fundamental rules of due pro-
cess of law, as required by constitutional or statu-
tory directions, as where made without adequate 
notire, fair hearing, and opportunity for the ag-
grieved party to present evidence, or in an other-
wise irregular proceeding, or is tainted with 
matters which disclose fraud, mistake, bad faith, 
corruption, or collusion, or is based upon an error 
of law. 
'' * * * The court has nothing vo d1o with the 
wisdom or expediency of the measures adopted 
by an admitnistrative agency to which the formula-
tion and execution of state policy has been in-
trusted, and must not substitute its judgment o.r 
notions of expediency and fairness or wisdom for 
tho·se which have guided. such agervcy, even where 
the proof is convincing tha.t a different result 
would have been better. These are matters left 
by the legislature to the administrative 'tribwnal 
appointed by law and ilnfotrmed by experience'." 
Page 626: 
"Sec. 211. QUESTIONS OF FACT. In the 
absence of statutory directions to the contrary, 
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and of any vital defect such as one with respect 
to jurisdiction or procedure, and except as there 
may be an exception for findings of facts bearing 
upon constitutional or jurisdictional issues, it is 
the general rule that administrative findings of 
fact are conclusive upon a reviewing court, and 
not within the scope of its reviewing powers, at 
least if supported 'by evidence, or substantial evi-
dence, or competent evidence, or if 'based upon 
conflicting evidence. The conclusiveness of find-
ings of fact by an administrative agency is not 
affected by the fact that there was a wide differ-
ence of opinion among its members, or that some 
of these members dissented. The court cannot 
substitute its judgment for that of an administra-
tive agency in making a finding of fact, and when 
the evidence warrants the conclusions of the 
administrative agency, the courts do not review." 
Page 641: 
"Sec. 216. REASONABLENESS OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE ACTION. Whether the reason-
ableness of administrative action is open to judi-
cial review cannot 'be answered simply and gen-
erally' because the meaning of the term 'reason-
ableness' is not entirely clear and the courts are 
not consistent in the use of the term. It is a 
general rule that the question of the wisdom or 
expediency of an administrative act is not to be 
decided by the court, but by the administrative 
body, and that the courts will not interfere with 
a proper exercise of administrative discretion.'' 
14 Am. Jur., p. 392: This author, dealing with this 
question of division of powers, under the subject of 
''Courts,'' says: 
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"Sec. 198. POWER OF JUDICIARY TO 
INTER.FERE "\YITH OR CONTROL EXECU-
TIVE DEPART.JlENT. In the consideration of 
the power of the judicial department to pass on 
the acts of the legislative and executive depart-
nlents, it is necessary to distinguish carefully the 
power of the courts to control the legislative or 
exooutiYe department by restraining or manda-
tory writs and the power of the court to review 
an act of either department when properly pre-
sented in a judicial proceeding. It is generally 
recognized that every act done or attempted to 
be done by any officer of the executive department 
in his official, and not in his individual, capacity, 
is shielded from all judicial interference or con-
trol, either by mandamus or injunction, even 
though such act may be founded in an error of 
judgment or an ·entire misapprehension of the 
official duty under the law. In other words, so 
long as a public governing body acts within the 
limits of its legal powers and jurisdiction, the 
exercise of its judgment and discretion is not 
subject to review or control by the courts at the 
instance of citizens, taxpayers, or other interested 
.persons, in the absence of a statute authorizing 
such review or control.'' 
Idaho Power and Transp. Oo. v. Stephenson, State 
E'fiJgineer (Ida.), 101 P. 821. Perhaps the point that 
the courts may not control executive officers in the exer-
cise of their discretion is sufficiently shown by the above. 
However, this Idaho case was dealing directly with the 
question of the ·state Engineer's fee on the final certi-
ficate of completion of a power plant and works. In 
this connection, the opinion says: 
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''Of course, if there was any question in 
regard to the sufficiency of the proof of comple-
tion the State Engineer could not be required to 
decide that such proof was sufficient, as his dis-
cretion in deciding that matter cannot be con-
trolled hy mandate.'' 
This quotation, with other authority, is cited by Weil, 
3rd Ed., p. 1110. At page 1119, the same author says: 
''But, as considered in the foregoing ·chapter, 
it is usually held that, while the decisions of the 
water officials are entitled to great respect, and 
in practice are not often disputed, yet the statute 
cannot vest in them the finality of judicial powers, 
........ :JI:" 
Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 155 
N.E. 628, 50 A.L.R. 1473. This case dealt with a con-
tract made by the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment, and with the question of wages, as contained there-
in, and was for ~the purpose of having the Court pass 
upon their action. 
'The opinion, by Justice Cardozo, held that the con-
tract was not illegal because of the objections claimed, 
and, on this general ·question of the exercise of discre-
tion, said: 
''Another fonn of contract might be more 
expedient or cheaper. The Courts do not sit in 
judgment upon questions of legislative policy or 
administrative discretion. 'rhe taxpayer must 
point to illegality or fraud.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
"\Yhere Yested rights are dependent upon run-off and 
drainage frmn prior use for direct and immediate irri-
gation, no case, so far as we can find, has 1permitted with-
holding for later irrigation under drier and hotter con-
ditions. Injury to such dependent rights naturally results 
from such withholding. 
Here, the evidence is undisputed, and is indisput-
able, that this water if applied later, will be subject to 
greater re-uses to the fullest extent right down to the 
Lake. And, will be used to irrigate the large area adja-
cent to the Lake, which, in the high water season of 
proposed withholding, is water-logged. 
It is agreed by the experts, as it must 'be, that, in the 
drier months, the evaporation of water, as exposed by 
surface irrigation, will be much greater, and that loss 
by transpiration, as the plant life is then fully develop-
ed, is substantially more than in May, when high water 
is intended to be withheld here. 
Also, it must be clear that there will be greater pro-
portional loss from the necessarily smaller stream appli-
cations, and a consequent delay and lag. These things 
are due to the very properties of water, and its natural 
action. 
For example, it is useless to deny tha:t water nat-
urally runs down hill. Or, that it runs faster and farther 
in large volume in a dry 'bed, or over dry ground, than 
in small volume. Or, that it will run faster and farther 
through, or over, a water-soaked or wa:ter-logged chan-
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nel, nr other soil, than ilt will over dry ones. And, in the 
earlier and cooler season, when the water table is near, 
or at, the surface, and the volume of flow is large, it is 
apparent that there will be much smaller loss in transit. 
No claim or argument can escape these natural con-
ditions, and they establish substantial loss to the Lake 
supply from this proposed operation, as well as the 
necessary change in time of the availability of the water 
to the users therefrom. 
These things seem so plain, as to lead to the con-
clusion that the reversal below was based solely on the 
finding that water had, in three out of many previous 
years, spilled from Utah Lake. And, it seems obvious 
to us that this was an error. That such waters are not 
referred to in, or related to, the application here, and 
cannot be reached by this character of application, at all. 
Likewise, the contention that the right to operate 
and control the changed distribution under the proposed 
plan belongs to the respondents, and is not the respon-
sibility of the State Engineer, seems to require no argu-
ment. This is answered by the statutes. Also, under the 
decree here, any distribution, as the case now stands, 
would have to be in accordance with the exact provisions 
of the application filed, including the co>nCU~rrent storage 
and release of water, its use over the whole 16,000-acre 
area, when released, and, also, so released as to take 
care of all power and o1the'r rights entitled to water in 
the area. So that respondents' intended purposes could, 
apparently, not be carried out. 
The only other conceivable basis of reversal of the 
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State Engineer, as we have said, is a disagreement be-
tween the Court aJld this officer, as to a possible 1nethod 
of ad1ninistration of the proposed plan, so as to prevent 
(1) an increase of respondents' water right, without an 
appropriation, or (2) interference with vested Lake 
rights. The Engineer says there can be no feasible plan 
of distribution, which will prevent these. 
\Yhether it is claimed that some such method might 
be conceived to avoid the natural effects of the plan, or 
whether the plan presents impossible problems of dis-
tribution which cannot be overcome, so as to prevent 
these results, are problems within the administrative 
and control duties imposed by the Legislature upon the 
Engineer. It does not seem to he within the power or 
province of the Court to overrule this administrative 
officer's determination of such matters, or to impose 
upon him the duty to do things, purely administrative 
in character, which he has determined he cannot do. 
Such powers are not constitutionally granted to the 
Courts. 
And, if the Engineer cannot undertake, or discharge, 
the statutory duties of administration under such pro-
posed change applications as this, the applicant will, in 
every such instance, inevitably gain an additional water 
right, without any appropriation, and the lower vested 
rights can have no assurance of the protection the statute 
(100-3-3) guarantees: that ''no change shall be made if 
it impairs any vested right,'' or have any protection. 
We have refrained from discussing any technical 
exceptions, taken on the Trial, because we are s~eking, 
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by this appeal, the determination of the important ques-
tions of policy involved here. These are o'f vital im-
portance to the Smte Engineer and the other appellants, 
and are involved in the future administration of water 
generally, in this State. 
We respectfully submit tha;t the State Engineer's 
decision should he sustained, and the decree of the ·Trial 
Court reversed. 
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